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INLUCETUA
Comment by the Editor
A War for Lent
Perhaps it is the experience-all too common in
these winter weeks-of four days in bed with la grippe
that has made metaphors of disorder and disease take
such strong hold in our mind. The war, pervasive and
omnipresent, seems like an abcessed tooth. The whole of
the body aches and sickens, poisoned by the small but
insistent core of rottenness. There is nothing to do about
the condition; the continual dripping of infected cells
into the blood stream goes on with an ineluctable, if
silent, certainty. You can call it anything you want, and
you can ignore its meaning, and you can call the symptoms signs of something else, but the abcess will move
steadily through its course, self-destructively collapsing its
own site as it goes.
Just how immoral we have been in our pursuit of this
war seems unclear to most citizens at this moment, but
our blindness cannot last forever. At some point the language of "softening up his defensive positions" and
"kicking his butt" and "stopping the course of unacceptable aggression" will have to give way to an
acknowledgement that our desire to humiliate yet another dark, foreign nation may be for the sake of our own
self-esteem. We will have to ask ourselves the meaning of
the cheery tokens of patriotism and togetherness that
have emerged as we all get together to kill other people
because we can do it. At some point we will have to call
ourselves to account for our destruction of other people's
lives and fortunes. As the tanks line up at the border, and
on this sunny winter afternoon we wait for the news that
someone has given the signal for a ground war to begin,
and we contemplate the contempt with which our president has treated the possibility of peace talks, how can
one not weep for the idea of an America we thought we
were, or might have been? There is talk about God
blessing America; it may be more to the point, if we
are going to invoke God at all, to consider that pity is
the best we might expect It is part of the mystery of
Lent that mercy is what we might encounter.

0
The Christian intellectual tradition has consistently
attempted to ease or perhaps at least moderate the
despair one feels in contemplating the folly and futility
of the human condition as it manifests itself in political
orders. Lutherans have often felt that the two kingdoms doctrine, for example, provides a comfortable
mental construction for .accommodating an acknowlMarch, 1991

edgement both of the world's wickedness and the certain goodness and powerful justice of God over against
that world.
In his book, The Political Meaning of
Christianity, Glenn Tinder joins that Christian intellectual tradition, and in doing so provides a provocative
contribution to the work of those thinkers who have
attempted to explore how we can be good Christians
and act well in the political sphere. This spring, the
Cresset Colloquium is meeting for five sessions to consider this book, and next fall, we will publish the results
of these conversations as a series of articles. This year's
Colloquium members are Richard Balkema, Dorothy
Bass, Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Thomas D. Kennedy
and Mel Piehl. Two lively sessions thus far prompt us
to encourage readers of the Cresset to get hold of the
book, and prepare to enjoy the fruits of study with us
beginning in September.

0
And, while we are on the subject of good books, a
loud hurrah! for A. S. Byatt's Possession, which is every
bit as good as all the reviews said. Rather like a Name of
the Rose for nineteenth century English literary history,
it is engaging, literate, humane, witty, accomplished,
entertaining, and even wise. Though it is about writing
and scholarship and sex, it is comic enough to risk recommending to certain grown children, and clean
enough for your mother. It has won all sorts of prizes,
and if we had one to give, I'd cheerfully award it on the
spot Also recommended, for getting through the last
of a particularly hard winter, Jay Parini's The Last
Station, a novel about Tolstoi's last months, Nadine
Gordimer's The Son's Story, Clyde Edgerton's Raney and
TheFloatplane Notebooks, Michael Malone's Handling Sin,
Ulysses S. Grant's Memoirs, Edna Hong's Tum Over Any
Stone, and of course, anything by P. G. Wodehouse. I'd
also encourage you to write to VU's Book Center for
Amen! Till Tomorrow, a collection of radio talks broadcast on shipboard in the Pacific theater by our
neighbor and sometime-reviewer, retired Methodist
minister John Wolf-when he was a 23 -year- old chaplain. All these, different as they are, offer a sense of
heart and hope, if only in the writers' integrity and
goodness, reflecting in manifold ways the only
Goodness we are likely to know.

GME
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Edging Toward Peace
Til.
Days of rain and, after, days of rain
again. Morning's a luminous mist, noon
a grey drizzle sliding toward night, and soon
comes night in a dark downpour. I tell the chain
of winter days like well-worn beads, a spell
against the dissolution of the day:
Keep watch; recite to the hour its proper grey;
wait; be awake. The vigilance is all.
What spell against the dissolution of
my life? The same? The vigilance is all?
How will you answer my passionate call,
"What would you have me do, Lord? How must I love?"
'Wait; be awake. My love will flow through you,
natural as rainfall, faithful as dew."

IV.

A week of mild weather has turned my head.
Here in the deep of winter, what clear blue
above, what blandishments of cloud! I've shed
my layers of jackets, gone exploring through
the neighbor's woods, expecting daffodils
and iris at the river's edge. One squirrel
drops by; a sparrow, bright and steady, spills
the beans about a new exuberant world.
Mother, my Gardener, like your small fern
I've been curled tight against the heel of cold,
clutching to heart the only green I know.
Now your soft touch undoes me, and I turn,
feeling my stingy winter heart unfold,
breathing your new air, emerald and slow.

Kathleen Mullen
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THE HONOR CODE
William F. May
Valparaiso University's honor system, adopted by
the faculty in 1944 at the initiative of the student body,
requires that students sign at the close of unproctored
examinations the following statement: "' have neither
given or received assistance, nor have I tolerated others' use of unauthorized aid."
Behind this statement lies the moral tradition of
honor codes, which perhaps my own university's code
more boldly exposes. Princeton University-an all
male institution at the time I was a student there in the
1940s-required us to sign at the close of every
exam-all of them unproctored-a statement which
read as follows: "I pledge my honor as a gentleman
that during this examination, I have neither given nor
received assistance."
Princeton's statement had its roots in an earlier
era-male chauvinist, to be sure. It suggests that men
peculiarly have a sense of honor or, at least, special
duties to uphold their honor. The word "gentlemen"
further suggests and reflects a distinction not just
between men and women but between two types of
men-gentlemen and those others who hustle and
work for a living and who, under the strain of scrambling in the marketplace might be somewhat more
tempted to behave in ways unbecoming to a gentleman. Thus the term "honor" harkens back to an
aristocratic culture preceding modern, middle class,
meritocratic culture. Gentlemen usually received an
inheritance: they didn't have to make it in the marketplace. The honor pledge associated the pledger with a
sense of class identity and with behavior befitting that
class.
The pledge presupposes that at least two types of
behavior ill befit the class: first, cheating, breaking the
rules of the game; and, second, lying about cheating.
A gentleman does not cheat and he tells the truth. So

William May is the Cary M . Maguire Professor of Ethics at
Southern Methodist University in Dallas, TX. The Cresset is
proud to publish this lecture, originally delivered to the VU faculty at the Opening Worltshop for the Academic ~ar 1990-91.
March, 1991

much so, that when either misbehavior exceptionally
occurs, gentlemen can devise their own internal mechanisms for enforcement. Hence exams need not be
proctored by aliens-the faculty. It befits gentlemen to
discipline their own. But more of this later.
The code turns on another key phrase. "I pledge
my honor." The term pledge suggests that one puts at
risk something of value that one would not want to lose
by the proscribed behavior. That valuable something is
one's honor. The code does not say, "' protest my innocence," but "' pledge my honor."

0
What is at issue in a culture that appeals to the
notion of honor and its correlative "shame"? Anthropologists have distinguished between two types of
cultures. The first type of culture relies upon the primary moral categories of honor and shame and the
second type, upon the moral notions of guilt and innocence. While these two ways of understanding human
behavior can operate, as well, in one and the same culture, each accents a different aspect of the moral life.
We can conveniently illustrate the moral differences between guilt and shame by examining the
extended, twelve step pledge of alcoholics as they
attempt to reconstruct their lives in the setting of Alcoholics Anonymous. Clearly, the alcoholic experiences
the dead weight of both guilt and shame; recovery
must deal with both. The fault-line between guilt and
shame, according to Ernest Kurtz, shows up in two
kinds of self-reproaches. Guilt accuses, "How could I
have done that!"; shame reproaches, "How could I have
done that!" (Kurtz 19)
Guilt springs from discrete, specific acts of commission and omission whereby the alcoholic has
harmed others. Thus, Step Four of the famous Twelve
Steps requires alcoholics to make a "searching and
fearless moral inventory" of themselves, in which they
identify the discrete deeds and specific harms which
they have imposed on others. Otherwise, the injuries
and wrongs they have committed and the duties they
5
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have dodged will spook and haunt them. Specific acts
of reparation then help alcoholics move through the
doorway into the future which moral inventories and
contrition have for the first time opened.
The alcoholic's problem however goes deeper
than guilt- it also sinks into shame. In Kurtz's typology,
guilt springs from doing wrong, but shame from being
flawed; guilt from a sense of wickedness, shame from a
sense of worthlessness; guilt from causing pain, shame
from feeling pain; guilt from the wrong exercise of
power and control, but shame from the lack of power
and control; guilt from the not-good, shame from the
no-good; guilt from injuring others, and shame from
demeaning the self. Guilt is objective; shame is subjective.
Shame is profoundly self-referential, so much so
that whereas we speak of the opposite of guilt as guiltless; we do not call the opposite of shame shameless.
Whereas the ashamed perceives his self as worthless,
the shameless has lost a sense of worth (and of self)
and therefore of the worth or worthlessness of the self
(Kurtz 69). Shame afflicts and therefore ultimately
posits a core identity. Shame does not spring simply
from the deeds of an agent, but rather from those
deeds as they reflect backward into one's core being or
lack thereof. Hollow men cannot feel shame.
In a culture of guilt, one condemns lies because
they wrong and harm others. In a culture of shame,
one condemns lies because they diminish the liar. But
shame does not spring exclusively from self-condemnation. Certainly, our shabby treatment of others can
provoke our own sense of self-diminution. But this feeling strengthens yet further when others learn what we
have done, or, more precisely, as we learn that they
know. Our shabby deeds suddenly expose us to view;
others see what we have done and reprove us. Thus,
our shameful sense that we do not enjoy or deserve the
esteem of others further lowers our self-esteem.
People in a shame-sensitive culture prize the
opposite of shame-honor; they value the approval of
others. They seek to prove their mettle and worth. A
challenge, a test, proves one true or false, worthy or
spurious. During such "moments of truth," a person
shows his stuff, displays his or her qualities. Such
moments reveal not abstract truth, but the truth the
early Greeks called Aliethiea, stepping forth into the
open, out of hiding. (In the Homeric epic, Aliethiea
required two participants-the warrior to perform the
deed and the poet to celebrate it. The two let a hero
step forth and show his qualities.) Correspondingly, an
honorable person acts openly and straightforwardly,
shows openly what, in fact, deserves approbation.
Oppositely, the person who feels shame must hide the
dreadful exposed lack he has shown, his failure as a
6

man. He knows that he has fallen short and that the
community finds him wanting. It esteems him not and
he loses self-esteem.
Guilt springs from deeds, but shame from the
deeper issue of identity. Thus Steps Six and Seven of
the Twelve Steps abandon the language of discrete acts
of reparation and suggest the language of reconnected
or "born again" identity-"Ready to have God remove
all these defects of character" and "humbly asked Him
to remove our shortcomings." This reconnecting treats
God as Polestar; hence, Step Eleven seeks "through
prayer and meditation to improve our conscious contact with God."
This reconnecting also points the initiate to the
inner community of Alcoholics Anonymous, that is, to
other, similar, flawed, desperate, powerless, human
individuals who have joined together in this latent
church of the afflicted. Guilt sends the alcoholic out
into the original communities from which he fled,
whose members he has aggrieved, offended, and
injured, to repair wrongs. Shame forces him to join the
altogether new community of similarly afflicted. There
he needs to repair his own soul in a community which
never excludes the self for reasons of its own shortfall.
In the AA, everyone has fallen short, has found himself
lacking, has known despair and powerlessness, has seen
the disapproving look in his child's eye and the even
harsher disapproval in the eye of his own soul.

00
In the foregoing set of distinctions between guilt
and shame, I have identified ancient Greece with cultures that orient primarily to the categories of honor
and shame. It is tempting to associate biblical religion
with cultures that rely exclusively on the distinction
between guilt and innocence. The Bible, for example,
identifies and prohibits specific actions that harm and
injure others--adultery, killing, stealing, lying, and coveting. However, we should not press this contrast too
far. The Bible is not insensitive to shame. It acknowledges not simply the injury of others but also
self-injury. The prophetjeremiah likens Israel's shameless behavior to the wild ass on a high hill who in her
season "snuffeth up the wind in her desire." Israel's
sins harm others but also plunge Israel into self-degradation. Or again, the New Testament warns against
self-degradation. "What does it profit the self if it gains
the world but forfeits its own self?"
In later Western history, shame and guilt link
with two differing types of societies, aristocratic and
middle class/meritocratic. The philosopher Montesquieu noted that in an aristocratic society honor
defines, not so much a particular virtue, but a nobleThe Cressset

ness of scale in all one's virtues. In aristocracies "the
actions of men are judged, not as virtuous, but as shining; not as just, but as great; not as reasonable, but as
extraordinary." (Montesquieu 29) Honor defines the
motives of a culture oriented more to the chivalric, the
knightly, the heroic, the extraordinary. A society driven
by honor is thirsty for glory.
An ethics of honor also encourages "a certain
frankness and open carriage." Montesquieu associates
the virtue of honesty or veracity with "an air of boldness and freedom." In effect, Montesquieu notes that
truthfulness characterizes the person of honor not for
the sake of the hearer of his words but as a reflection
of that freedom and boldness which the honorable
person should evince. This freedom of bearing, Montesquieu believed, distinguishes behavior in an
aristocratic society from the calculating servility of subordinates in a despotic society. The tyrant wants his
subjects servile. They must trim and shave their words
and watch their step. The man of honor in such an
environment must be ready to die. A certain contempt
for his own life makes possible his courage. "... We are
permitted to set a value upon our future, but are absolutely forbidden to set any upon our lives." The despot
cannot tolerate such a display of honor. Thus the aristocrat glories in the contempt of life which undercuts
the despot's power "founded on the power of taking it
away." (Montesquieu 26-32)
A modern, middle class, careerist culture hardly
resembles in most particulars a despotic society, but
fear and anxiety figure large in both. The anxious
modern careerist finds it difficult to act with that selfconfidence and boldness that ideally marked the
person of honor. Servility tends to mark the competitors in a meritarian educational system. Students
engage in a lifelong scramble for grades in order to get
into the top professional schools that will put them in
the best jobs, that will buy them the best homes, that
will eventually turn the keys into the best cemeteries.
The subjective correlate of a despotic society-fear-besets
a despotic society and a highly competitive, meritarian
society alike. In a despotic society fear is personal; in a
meritarian society, it often takes a somewhat more
impersonal form. "Pressure" is our word for that diffuse fear that constricts movement, crimps action, and
stutters speech.

000
The modern justifications for an academic honor code largely fit the sensibilities of a society oriented
to the problem of guilt. To violate the honor code perpetrates an act of injustice upon others. A meritocratic
society presupposes morally a level playing field. EveryMarch, 1990

one must play by the rules of the game in testing out
performance. When I cheat, I refuse to play on a level
field, and I hide my true performance by using crib
notes, eyeballing the work of my neighbor, stealing
advance information about an exam, or passing off the
writing of others as my own. Thereby, I injure both students who make the poorer grade, which my own
ignorance deserved, and students who make the better
grade which my cheating misleadingly secures for me.
What begins in college often continues afterward.
Insider trading inverts cheating on an exam. In insider
trading, I exploit hidden knowledge to steal money
from others. In cheating on an exam, I hide my ignorance to steal a grade from others by diluting and
distorting the meaning of their grade. In both cases, I
perpetrate an injustice. Inside traders go to jail. Exam
cheaters, if caught, get an F-perhaps a warning shot
across the bow to remind all competitors in a meritocratic society that they should be playing according to
the same rules in the same game.
Further, indirectly and cumulatively, my action
contributes to the erosion and corruption of an institution upon whose good health and integrity the society
at large depends. First and most immediately, the academic institution, and, second and more broadly, those
powerful institutions in the outside world. The classroom cheater makes an easy transition to becoming
the inside trader, the S & L wheeler-dealer, the wartime
profits exploiter, the secret industrial polluter-all
those who abuse the power which an academic degree
helps place within their reach.
Violating the honor code, however, not only
injures and wrongs others (and other institutions), it
also injures and wrongs one's self. It entails that moral
loss and forfeit which traditional cultures of shame
sensed so keenly. Self-injury and self-degradation occur
at several levels. First, the cheater cheats himself out of
an education. He substitutes ingenuity for knowledge,
cleverness for wisdom. His manipulation of the system
eventually arouses and reinforces cynicism; and cynicism, when fixed in him, makes him uneducable. (Not
merely uneducated, but uneducable. The uneducated
person has merely failed to study, the cynic has rejected
the very possibility of being educated, that is, of being
enlarged, drawn out, and changed by knowledge. For
the cynic automatically trashes everything-the noble
as well as the trivial. He reduces both alike to rubble.)
Second, the cheat places himself under psychological
strain-the strain of those who fear being found out, of
being exposed for the fraud that they are. He carries
the heavy burden of Dante's hypocrite who wears a
coat oflead painted gold.
But cultures of shame warn us of a deeper selfinjury than educational deprivation and psychological
7
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strain. The cheat ultimately diminishes himself. He loses the straightforward bearing, the boldness, of the
free person. "What shall it profit a person to gain the
whole world but to lose his own soul." One ruptures
one's integrity, one's identity. One alters one's inward
being; one is no longer a person who can come to
terms with himself, and remain himself in the midst of
strain and temptation.

0000
Honor systems face vexing issues of enforcement
in our time. A meritocratic society generally depends
upon the external enforcement of standards. Football
players have to cope with referees; baseball players with
umpires; tennis players with line judges; business people with the courts; and students with proctors.
A highly legalistic society such as ours-we have
more lawyers per acre in the United States than any
other society on the face of the earth-produces a kind
of anti-nomianism of the law. That is, the law does not
point beyond itself to a higher righteousness, an absolute ideal, but it marks with phosphorous paint
minimal standards. It lets people know maximally what
they can get away with; and, thus, absent the referee,
the umpire, the linesman, the proctor, the policeman
and the judge, it encourages the ambitious, the lazy,
and the desperate to think that they can flout the rules
as freely as they like to their own advantage.
An honor code depends largely upon the internal enforcement of standards. First, the individual
student by and large internally accepts the code and
abides by it without the necessity of policing; and, second, students themselves will largely see to its
enforcement upon the few of their members who violate the standards.
The internal enforcement of standards cannot
occur, however, unless members of a group identify
inwardly with those standards. Thus how does one
form and maintain the identity of students with the
intrinsic good of education and not simply the extrinsic goods of grades? Since students do not come to a
university with their identity fully formed and in place,
how does one develop their identity with an education
in the midst of a society which massively disdains its
honored ideals? Our society rarely sends its students to
college for an education, but for grades and a degree,
jobs, and promotions. We go for glitz rather than
goods, for the glow of style rather than the rewards of
substance.
The problem of self-regulation is culture wide.
The feeble effort of students to be self-policing and
self-disciplined only anticipates the later, feeble efforts
of the professions to be self-policing. A former presi8

dent of the AMA once conceded that 5% of doctors are
unethical or incompetent, but in the same year only 75
(out of 20,000 unethical/incompetent doctors) had
their licenses removed. Churches rarely defrock their
morally inadequate religious leaders; academics rarely
return a negative tenure judgment based on incompetence against colleagues. (Since academics do not
perform much better in self-regulation than their fellow professionals, perhaps the deepest question
universities must face is the question of their own institutional identity.) In any event, the moral problem
students must address in supporting an honor code
anticipates the problem burgeoning later in the culture at large. Society creates through education a
ruling class and yet does blessed little to instruct that
ruling class in the rigors of self-discipline apart from
which its power surely corrupts.
Am I my colleague's keeper? The brief answer is,
yes. It is not good enough for a doctor to practice well
while winking at his malpracticing colleagues, for an
academic to teach well but to pass on to tenure the
teacher who will bore and discourage students for generations to come, or for the student himself not to
cheat, but by silence and inaction to turn test results
into candy grades.
Thus I read with some gratification the straightforward statement by a senior student at Valparaiso
University, Noelle Haughty, who wrote that "Not only is
the student responsible for personal honor but for the
honor of other students as well." That's a very important moral move on the part of students at a university
with some awareness that by bestowing knowledge,
grades, and degrees, it bestows an enormous power
upon those who will wield power for 40-50 years. And if
students acquire that power shabbily, they will not be
inclined to use it nobly, justly, compassionately, or
responsibly.
Still, how does one establish and sustain such an
institutional identity in a society which so massively has
ignored, repressed, mocked, or disdained that identity
and then expect young people to assume that identity
upon admission to a university? Very frankly, I don't
have something new to propose beyond the steps
which Valparaiso University has already taken in
response to the earlier work of Professor Reidel, Kenneth Klein, and other members of the Committee on
Academic Integrity and the subsequent actions taken
by President Harre after faculty and student discussion
of that report
Strategies for disciplining and enhancing the
moral life of a community inevitably (and at their best)
include both a negative and a positive aspect. The
more censorial negative requires as its complement the
educational positive. Your decisions reflect both·.
The Cresset

First, several proposals in the report orient negatively. How does one discourage behavior that, at its
best, depends upon self-regulation and yet depends
upon regulators who are not fully convinced of the
moral grounds for that regulation and have not fully
identified themselves with it or who fear that if they
blow the whistle they will forfeit their place among colleagues and friends?
Valparaiso has answered that question by providing, as a last resort, for external regulation (that is, the
faculty proctoring of exams), but also, by insisting that
students must initiate the request for that proctoring in
a particular course. The university has also provided
for the full protection of the identity of that whistle
blower. These provisions seem to me a fair compromise
and accommodation to a society where the desired
ethos has not fully taken hold and students themselves
are extremely vulnerable to ostracism and rejection if
they make a move to support an ethos not yet fully
established.
Further, Valparaiso has also provided for greater
faculty participation (but not majority participation) in
court proceedings-perhaps to give students a little
more confidence in returning negative judgments
where such judgments are deserved.
But, second, Valparaiso's report recognizes that
education is the necessary positive to the negative of
disciplinary activity. Negative regulation at best
enforces minimal rules. The positive of education
ought to help internalize maximal ideals that energize
the aspiration to excellence, and that begin to create

bolder, more self-confident, more courageous students.
Valparaiso's decisions rightly recognize that a strong
educational effort alone will strengthen the honor system. Clearly, that effort will not materialize if faculty
members merely hand out pro forma the regulations on
the honor code or punt the problem to the central
administration. Education requires clarifying for and
with students the broader links between the rules of
the game in college with the kind of ruling class we will
create and suffer together. It poses for students, early
in their lives as citizens, the moral and political question as to whether their society will mix shamelessness
with power or whether it will turn out leaders with
some sense of honor and decency both in dealing with
others and in coming to terms with themselves.
Education of this moral magnitude requires more
than the hurried acquisition of information about the
rules of the game. It may require something resembling those powerful rites by which traditional societies
inducted their young into the sacred. Such moral education invites and requires nothing less than an
alteration in human identity.O
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A Runner's Denial
The road before me stretches, cold and grey
Into the jagged hills where sinking sun
Hurls fading color at the dying day;
On asphalt hours by hours by hours I run.
I pass the field once ripe with green and gold;
I stride beside the stripped and barren rows;
The reaper's hook has struck the razor cold;
Husks drift in autumn winds assuring snows.
Dark comes. The churchyard glows in ghostly light
From the harvest moon which grins above the field;
Once-vigorous day has curled up into night;
I see the granite markers of the yield.
I shiver, spit, and turn the other way,
Toward where the eastern hills gave birth to day.

Dan Kaderli
March, 1991
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MOTHERS OF THE NOVEL:
REDISCOVERING EARLY WOMEN WRITERS
Mollie Sandock

In Northanger Abbey, completed in 1803, Jane
Austen playfully but vigorously defends the novel, the
eighteenth-century female-centered novel chiefly written and read by women, as a literary form worth
reading. She boldly admits that her heroine reads novels:
... Yes, novels; - for I will not adopt that ungenerous and
impolitic custom so common with novel writers, of degrading
by their contemptuous censure the very performances, to the
number of which they are themselves adding-joining with
their greatest enemies in bestowing the harshest epithets on
such works, and scarcely ever permitting them to be read by
their own heroine, who, if she accidentally take up a novel, is
sure to turn over its insipid pages with disgust. Alas! if the
heroine of one novel be not patronized by the heroine of
another, from whom can she expect protection and regard?
(57-58)
Austen shows how the female novelist is traduced
by the male reviewer, and valued below the "man who
collects and publishes in a volume some dozen lines of
Milton, Pope, and Prior, with a paper from the Spectator and a chapter from Sterne" or "the nine-hundredth
abridger of the history of England." The productions
of such men are granted high status as literature, but
... there seems almost a general wish of decrying the capacity and undervaluing the labour of the novelist, and of
slighting the performances which have only genius, wit, and
taste to recommend them. 'I am no novel reader-! seldom
look into novels-Do not imagine that I often read novels-It
is really very well for a novel'-Such is the common
cant.-'And what are you reading, Miss-?' 'Ohl it is only a
novel!' replies the young lady; while she lays down her book
with affected indifference or momentary shame.-'It is only
Cecilia, or Camilla, or Belinda;' or, in short, only some work
Mollie Sandock, a member of the Department of English at
VU, has unitten on nineteenth century literature, is studying
the economic and social dimensions of eighteenth century fiction, and also teaches contemporary literature. She is active in
campus discussions ofgender and curriculum.
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in which the greatest powers of the mind are displayed, in
which the most thorough knowledge of human nature, the
happiest delineation of its varieties, the liveliest effusions of
wit and humour are conveyed to the reader in the best chosen language. (58; my italics)
Austen knew that every contemporary reader
would instantly recognize the novels she cites. Now,
however, editors feel obliged to give footnotes explaining to the general reader who Frances Burney (Cecilia
and Camilla) and Maria Edgeworth (Belinda) were.
Austen's other novels and her letters are full of
allusions to the works of the writers from whom she
learned her craft, many of whom are buried even more
deeply in oblivion than Burney and Edgeworth: Charlotte Lennox, Frances Sheridan, Charlotte Smith, Ann
Radcliffe, Sarah Harriet Burney, Regina Maria Roche,
Mary Brunton, Elizabeth Hamilton, Lady Morgan,
Hannah More, Jane West. Recent scholars who have
tried to relate Austen to the feminist and progressive
movements of her day have made a good case that she
must also have known the works of Mary Wollstonecraft, Elizabeth Inchbald, Amelia Opie, and Mary
Hays. Recent students of the novel would add the
names of Aphra Behn, Delariviere Manley, Eliza Haywood, Mary Davys, Jane Barker, Sarah Fielding, and
Clara Reeve, among others, to the list of those whose
art culminated in the art of "Cecilia, or Camilla, or
Belinda," and of Austen herself.
A generation ago, when I was in college, none of
the works on Austen's Northanger Abbey honor role was
in print, nor were the works of most of the writers mentioned above. Because these novels were not in print
in a form which could be purchased, they could not be
taught in English courses which employed inexpensive
paperbacks, and they were not even owned in hardback by most college libraries. These novels lived in
scattered collections in rare-book departments of large
research libraries and were the province of specialists
who considered themselves historians more than literary critics.
TM Cresset

Because most early novels by women were out of
print and thus could not be taught, people who went
to college when I did had a partial and skewed view of
the development of the English novel. The title of a
recent book which introduced a new paperback series
of once-forgotten novels is Dale Spender's Mothers of the
Novel: One Hundred Good Women Novelists Before Jane
Austen. (Spender's is not really an academic book but a
frenetic 357-page fan letter; a much better overview of
the early women novelists is given by Jane Spencer in
The Rise of the Woman Novelist.) The first reaction of
most people educated as English majors is amusement
and disbelief: there can't possibly be one hundred
women novelists, much less good novelists, before Jane
Austen. The eighteenth-century novel, we were taught,
consists of Richardson and Fielding (perhaps with
Defoe as an almost worthy predecessor), Smollett if
you like that sort of thing, Mackenzie for those interested in the byways of sentimentalism, and the startlingly
prescient Sterne. Later in the century, there was a
blank, filled in part by "minor" writers like Burney and
Edgeworth, forerunners and heralds of Jane Austen,
who began to invent the nineteenth-century novel after
first making fun of the lady novelists of the day. We
might hear the names of such selected lady novelists as
Radcliffe and Inchbald, but we would not be expected
to make the sacrifice of actually reading them. The
names of the others listed above we would not hear at
all. The "real" English novel, the novel of the Victorians, lay ahead, beyond the deserts of the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and independent of them.
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Recently, however, the once-forgotten "mothers"
of the novel have begun to return to print, and the
landscape of the seventeenth-, eighteenth-, and nineteenth-century novel is beginning to look quite
different In the 1970s, many long-forgotten early novels by both women and men began to escape from
closely-guarded rare book rooms when they began to
appear in microform and hardback reprint editions.
These editions were too expensive for undergraduate
classroom use and graduate student budgets, but at
least they could be checked out of the library and read
freely. Facsimile editions made the novels accessible at
least to those who were prepared to deal with the eighteenth-century long "s" (which looks like "f") and
could decipher passages like "the blufh of pleafure,
with which Camilla heard the firft fentence of this
fpeech, became a tingle of fhame at the fecond, and
whitened into furprife and forrow at the laft"
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The next step in the resurfacing of early novels by
women came when two special-purpose paperback
series began making the novels available at affordable
prices.
In recent years, the pointedly-named Virago and
Pandora presses have begun to bring Jane Austen's
teachers to light Virago, which in the late 1970's had
begun publishing its "Modern Classics," has recently
begun to edge backwards into the eighteenth century
with works like Sarah Scott's 1762 Millennium Hal~ a
Utopian vision of a group of women who have successfully escaped from the marriage market and its
alternatives of dependence or poverty and have established a peaceful independent female society devoted
to study, philanthropy, and the arts. The Pandora Press
"Mothers of the Novel" Series, begun in the late '80s,
was specifically devoted to publishing the works of the
alleged "One Hundred Good Women Novelists Before
Jane Austen"; this series made it possible for me to
understand at long last Austen's jokes about Mary
Brunton's Self-Control and to adorn my shelves with
titles like Mary Hamilton's Munster Village, prompting
my friends to make bad jokes about old TV series.
Pandora Press is no longer publishing, and its
"Mothers of the Novel" series (now handled by Unwin)
has not completed its ambitious plans to publish one
hundred novels. Many of its '80s titles are now out of
print, but it enabled many people and many academic
and public libraries to acquire the works of Austen's
teachers, and it enabled college courses taught in the
late '80's to teach them. Virago, however, remains in
excellent health; its handsome and inexpensive paperbacks continue to extend the range of what can be
taught And as Pandora and Virago have brought out
these works, excellent standard paperback publishers
like Oxford University Press have begun to bring out
better editions of many of the same titles.
I have just received a catalogue from Oxford University Press in which I am urged to buy Burney's
Cecilia and Camilla, as well as two more of her novels. I
am also offered Sarah Fielding's The Adventures of
David Simple (in her day, Sarah Fielding was as famous
as her brother Henry; Dr. Johnson preferred her works
to his). Oxford urges me to consider Elizabeth Inchbald's A Simple Story, as well as Charlotte Lennox's The
Female QJJ.ixote, the story of a young girl beguiled by the
myths of female power she finds in her reading of
French romances; Austen found that Lennox's novel
held up well to a second reading. The catalogue further offers three of Ann Radcliffe's Gothic thrillers
(the very "horrid" novels which enthrall the young
heroine of Northanger Abbey) and Charlotte Smith's The
Old Manor House (Smith is the writer whom the heroine
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of Austen's early "Catherine, or The Bower" is eager to
discuss with her friend). Most gratifyingly, Oxford
offers me all of these long-ignored texts under the
rubric of "The World's Classics"! All of these novels
can now be studied by any interested scholar and
taught in college courses--this is what shapes generations of students' idea of the literary "canon"-and
they are also available to the exploration of all of those
readers who wish that Austen or the Brontes had written just one more.
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What did these newly restored "foremothers"
write? I am struck both by the exuberant variety of
what they wrote and by the overt concern so many of
them have with questions about Woman's proper role,
rights, duties, and nature. Among other things, they
wrote illustrations of the evils of slavery and celebrations of the single life. They wrote softcore
pornography, sometimes starring thinly-veiled portraits
of contemporary public figures. They wrote pious
tracts and subtly revolutionary Utopian visions. They
wrote love stories, some of which vary sharply from
what the reader of canonical eighteenth- and nineteenth-century works might expect. They wrote works
exploring power relations within the family. They
wrote political tracts about the Wrongs of Woman and
the futility of present social arrangements. They wrote
political parables in support of and in opposition to
the principles of the French Revolution. They wrote
didactic works recommending retirement, submission,
and silence to young women, in narrative voices of
ironically great authority and power.
It is remarkable that so many of these women,
from the most radical to the most apparently conservative, give voice to complaints about the social, physical,
and mental constraints placed upon Englishwomen in
the eighteenth century. One pervasive theme has to
do with women's access to education (it is not surprising that women who themselves wrote books, even
books advocating female piety and submission, found
themselves uneasily confronting cultural taboos against
studious women). In the eighteenth century, the "conduct literature," books of instruction and advice for
young ladies, makes it very clear that serious study is
"unfeminine" and makes women repellent to men: it
will hurt them on the marriage market, and it will
make them seem not only unfeminine but unchaste.
Works like James Fordyce's Sermons to Young Women
(1776) and Dr. Gregory's A Father's ugacy to his Daughters (1774) were reprinted many times and widely read
throughout the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
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centuries. Fordyce warns young ladies to avoid such
"masculine" pursuits. Dr. Gregory instructs his daughters to hide their good sense, and especially to hide
their learning from men: "keep it a profound secret."
Lady Mary Wortley Montagu gives the same advice:
women must hide their learning as they would hide
crookedness or lameness!
Studies thought particularly dangerous for young
women include "masculine" subjects like Latin and
Greek, which were the preserve of upper-class and
monied males. Latin is the mark of a "gentleman," a
term which includes both gender and class: both "gentle" as opposed to "simple" and "man" as opposed to
"woman." Mathematics and, later, the sciences also fell
into this forbidden "unfeminine" zone, and thorough
professional skill at any branch of knowledge is likewise
suspect. "Learned ladies," anomalous scholarly women, are targets of vituperation in the pages of novelists
like Henry Fielding and Tobias Smollett.
Eighteenth-century women novelists illustrate the
harm done by such constraints upon women's minds.
Sarah Fielding, in The Adventures ofDavid Simp/£ (1744),
gives us the history of Cynthia, whose frustration must
have been shared by many:
I cannot say, I ever had any Happiness in my Ufe; for
while I was young, I was bred up with my Father and Mother,
who, without designing me any harm, were continually. teasing me. I loved Reading, and had a great Desire of attaining
Knowledge; but whenever I asked Questions of any kind
whatsoever, I was always told, such Things are not proper for
Girls of my Age to know: If I was pleased with any Book above
the most silly Story or Romance, it was taken from me, for
Miss must not enquire too far into things, it would turn her
Brain; she had better mind her Needle-work, and such
Things as were useful for Women; reading and poring on
Books, would never get me a Husband. ( 311)
Some early women writers shared in part this disapproval of "learned ladies" and found ways to avoid
considering themselves members of that category,
while others clearly rejected the prohibition against
intellectual work for women, and in their novels used
various strategies for defending women's right to learn
things. Some writers invented extreme "learned lady"
characters, made it clear that these characters were disapproved, and then used such characters as a "cover"
so that the heroines could engage in modest intellectual activity without anyone noticing. Others more
forthrightly made their heroines "learned ladies" themselves, apologizing for this with various degrees of
defensiveness.

The Cresstt

Frances Burney's first novel was the anonymously
published Evelina, or The History of a Young Lady's
Entrance into the World (1778) . The title character is a
sharp observer of contemporary social and sexual politics, and of course the author, a young woman in her
twenties, is by her act of publication setting herself up
as a keen student of the social arrangements of her
day. She protected herself through anonymity and
repeated protestations of feminine horror at pushing
herself forward as an author, and she also invented a
character, Mrs. Selwyn, a learned lady, who acted as
shield for her heroine and herself. Evelina, writing to
a friend, describes Mrs. Selwyn, an older woman who is
accompanying her on a trip:
Mrs. Selwyn is very kind and attentive to me. She is
extremely clever; her understanding, indeed, may be called
masculine; but, unfortunately, her manners deserve the same
epithet; for, in studying to acquire the knowledge of the other sex, she has lost all the softness of her own. In regard to
myself, however, as I have neither courage nor inclination to
argue with her, I have never been personally hurt at her want
of gentleness; a virtue which, nevertheless, seems so essential
a part of the female character, that I find myself more awkward, and less at ease, with a woman who wants it, than I do
with a man. She is not a favourite with Mr. Villars [her saintly
guardian, an elderly clergyman] who has often been disgusted at her unmerciful propensity to satire. (268-269; Burney's
italics)
Here Evelina and her author free themselves by
"correctly" criticizing Mrs. Selwyn, whose masculine
mind and masculine studies ruin her feminine gentleness; with criticism deflected onto Mrs. Selwyn, the
author herself can be quietly knowledgeable and she
and the heroine can be quite "unmercifully satirical"
without attracting undue criticism. Furthermore, Mrs.
Selwyn's masculine studies also prove useful to Burney
in another way. Mrs. Selwyn knows the classics well, as
aristocratic young men ought to but often do not; she
exposes the ignorance of the languid and vicious aristocrats into whose company Evelina falls. They snub
Evelina, and Mrs. Selwyn thoroughly retaliates by shaming them; the heroine can thus maintain the approved
stance of injured innocence, and the officially disapproved Mrs. Selwyn can do her work, and Burney's
work, for her.
It is interesting to note that while Burney has
Evelina deplore Mrs. Selwyn's masculine studies, she
also puts the novel's longest statement of the standard
antifeminist line into the mouths of characters even
more officially disapproved, these ridiculous, parasitical young men. The cowardly fop, Mr. Love], begins, in
an attempt to fend off Mrs. Selwyn's satire:
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"I have an insuperable aversion to strength, either of
body or mind, in a female. "
"Faith, and so have I," said Mr. Coverly; "for egad I'd as
soon see a woman chop wood, as hear her chop logic."
"So would every man in his senses," said Lord Merton;
"for a woman wants nothing to recommend her but beauty
and good-nature; in every thing else she is either impertinent
or unnatural. For my part, deuce take me if ever I wish to
hear a word of sense from a woman, as long as I live!" (361)
Jane Austen adopts a similar method of "covering
for" a heroine with what contemporaries would call a
masculine mind in Pride and Prejudice. She gives her
heroine Elizabeth Bennet a sister, Mary, who is a cartoonish figure of a female pedant; Mary deflects the
criticism from Elizabeth as Mrs. Selwyn does from
Evelina. Characters unfriendly to Elizabeth, like Miss
Bingley, who is trying to marry Mr. Darcy herself,
accuse her of bookishness, and Elizabeth and Austen
must repeatedly mount a defense against this damning
suggestion. In this scene, Elizabeth is reading a book
while others play cards:
Mr. Hurst looked at her with astonishment.
"Do you prefer reading to cards?" said he; "that is
rather singular."
"Miss Eliza Bennet," said Miss Bingley, "despises cards.
She is a great reader and has no pleasure in anything else."
"I deserve neither such praise nor such censure," cried
Elizabeth; "I am not a great reader, and I have pleasure in
many things." (83; Austen's italics)
With Mary as a stalking-horse or scapegoat like Mrs.
Selwyn, and with disclaimers of this kind, Elizabeth can
read, look forward with great pleasure to Mr. Darcy's
library at Pemberley, and even use the language of formal logical debate with her sister Jane and still retain
contemporary readers' sympathy. Austen also confronts the question ofwomen's education a little more
directly through acid humor directed at the idea that
women ought not to know anything. These are bitter
jokes, but they can still be passed off as merely jokes. In
Norlhanftl!T Abbey, the narrator remarks,
Where people wish to attach, they should always be
ignorant. To come with a well-informed mind is to come
with an inability of administering to the vanity of others,
which a sensible person would always wish to avoid. A woman especially, if she have the misfortune of knowing anything,
should conceal it as well as she can.
The advantages of natural folly in a beautiful girl have
been already set forth by the capital pen of a sister author,
[Burney, in Camilla] -and to her treatment of the subject I
will only add in justice to men, that though to the larger and
more trifling part of the sex, imbecility in females is a great
enhancement of their personal charms, there is a portion of
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them too reasonable and too well informed themselves to
desire anything more in a woman than ignorance. (125)
I was recently surprised to learn that two of
Austen's rediscovered predecessors, Mary Brunton and
Frances Sheridan, treat the question "learned ladies" in
a much more forthright way. In her novel Self-Control
(1810), Brunton avoids the strategy of inventing an
"officially disapproved" figure like Mrs. Selwyn or Mary
Bennet; she comes right out and makes her heroine
herself a learned lady.
Laura Montreville, our heroine, studies mathematics with the man she will eventually marry; they also
read Tacitus in the original. Laura and her wicked
aunt, Lady Pelham, both begin to study math, but her
aunt gives up at the first difficulty, and Brunton brilliantly puts the usual anti-feminist lines about learned
ladies into the silly aunt's mouth; she then repeatedly
and defensively assures us that math has not ruined
Laura's charm. Laura enters into her studies
... with a pleasure that surprised herself, and she persevered
in it with an industry that astonished her teacher. Lady Pelham was, for a little while, the companion of her labours;
but, at the first difficulty, she took offence at the unaccommodating thing, which shewed no more indulgence to
female than to royal indolence. -Forthwith she was frred
with a strong aversion to philosophers in bibs, and a horror
at shepedants, a term of reproach which a dexterous sideglance could appropriate to her niece, though the author of
these memoirs challenges any mortal to say that ever Laura
Montreville was heard to mention ellipse or parabola, or to
insinuate her acquaintance with the properties of circle or
polygon. (255)

finishing this beautiful rose here, that seems to blush at your
neglect of it? He spoke this, pointing to a little piece of
embroidery that lay in a frame before me. I was nettled at
the question, it was too assuming. Sir, I hope I was as innocently, and as usefully employed; and I assure you I give a
greater portion of my time to my needle, than to my book.
You are so lovely, madam, that nothing you can do
needs an apology. An apology, I'll assure you!Did not this
look, my dear, as if the man thought I ought to beg his pardon for understanding Latin? (73)
Sheridan is certain that no apology is required; like so
many women who wrote in the eighteenth century, she
does not find intellectual activity intrinsically "unfeminine."
In A Room of One's Own, Virginia Woolf wrote
about "the extreme activity of mind which showed itself
in the later eighteenth century among women." She
claimed enormous importance for the historical
moment in which ordinary women (as opposed to aristocrats) began to claim the beginnings of a public
vmce:
... towards the end of the eighteenth century a change
came about which, if I were rewriting history, I should
describe more fully and think of greater importance than the
Crusades or Wars of the Roses. The middle-class woman
began to write. (68)
Today we can witness another momentous change: we
are beginning to read what she wrote. 0
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Letter from Tanzania
Edgar Senne

It was something I had only
tried to imagine; it was called the
"third world," its nations identified
as "developing." Suddenly, I was
flying through the night somewhere
between Frankfurt and Nairobi,
somewhere between these first and
third worlds. I was about to have my
own direct experience of life in that
world. In a way it was like a dream
about to come true, for I had
longed for this kind of opportunity
ever since the mid-sixties, when I
was researching the life of one of
Kenya's most powerful ethnic
groups (we used to call them
"tribes"), the Gikuyu. This was the
group from which came Jomo
Kenyatta, first president of the new
independent nation of Kenya. As I
studied the traditional religious and
cultural life of the Gikuyu and other
African ethnic groups, I could only
hope that the day would come when
I would get a closer look.
The plane landed in Nairobi at
10:20 P.M. local time. As we left the
plane and entered the walkway to
the airport terminal building, I did
Edgar Senne has taught in the VU
Department of Theology since 1962. His
courses on world religions, and on the
religions of Native America, routinely
have waiting lists. This letter will be
followed by another, from Nigeria.
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a double take when I saw the
soldiers lined up, three on each side
of that walkway, in full forest camouflage attire, holding their submachine guns in combat-ready position
and watching every step I took. My
mind started spinning. What is this
all about? Has something awful
happened here in Nairobi, something that we have not heard about?
Are they expecting a major invasion
from some dangerous foreign
power? Surely, they are not deploying their armies to defend against
twenty-one college professors from
the United States and Canada, most
of whom were too advanced in years
to make good soldiers! This
conspicuous military presence
continued throughout the terminal
and was a bit unsettling. One of our
group finally dared to ask a soldier,
"Why are you here with your guns
all ready for action?" The answer
seemed so simple, "To make it safe
for the planes to come and go and
for people like you to travel where
you want to travel." I wondered, "Is
such conspicuous security a standard part of life in the new African
nations?"
Immigration and Customs
went more smoothly than I had
thought it might, and soon we were
speeding down the wrong side of
the road toward our first lodging
place in Africa, the guest house of
the Church Province of Kenya
(CPK), an accommodation operated
for travelers by the Anglican
Mission. As our bus sped down that
road in the dark of night, the lighted signs and billboards along the
road were familiar at about a fifty
percent rate. I recall CalTex Petrol,
Firestone, GM, Sanyo, Sony, Toyota
and other familiars. This is the city
of Nairobi; wonder what it's like
thirty miles out in any direction?
It's a pretty remarkable thing
how I happened to be in on this
adventure. There's an organization
headquartered in Washington, DC,
that goes by the acronym LECNALutheran Educational Conference

of North America. The forty-three
Lutheran colleges and universities,
under the leadership of the executive offices, made a successful grant
application to the United States
Department of Education for a
Fulbright-Hays Travel Abroad
award. Applicants were invited from
member schools, and twenty-one of
us were selected to participate in
this six-week travel seminar.
All this was designed to help us
globalize-this seems to be the buzzword these days, and I even had to
teach the word to the spell checker
on my word processor. Globalize
the minds of our students, globalize
the courses we teach and globalize
the whole curriculum as much as
possible. This high purpose is born
out of the well-documented fact that
Americans lack knowledge and
understanding of non-western
cultures. Our travel seminar to
Africa is one of the many attempts
being made to try to make a difference in this matter. So, there are
some strings attached; it's not the
usual safari.
As I write to you, we are nearing the end of our time in Tanzania.
We have been here for three weeks,
here on the Indian Ocean side of
Africa. Soon we will be flying to
Nigeria in West Africa, on the
Atlantic Ocean side of Africa.
Looking back on all that has been
packed into these last three weeks, it
is hard to decide what I most want
to share with you. But, of course,
some things do stand out.
I will never forget where I
spent Friday, the sixth day of July.
We drove a couple hours on the
dreadful back roads outside of our
headquarters in Arusha, on our way
to visit Munjere, a traditional Maasai
village just a few hundred yards
from the Great Rift. We stopped at
a small town called Mtowa Mbu
(river of mosquitoes), where a
German missionary briefed us on
the Maasai village we were about to
visit and how it was that the
Lutheran church was invited to
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come to that village in the first
place. As we continued our drive to
the engan'g (a Maasai settlement)
called Munjere, our four Land
Rovers kept a quarter mile distance
between them to avoid the worst of
the dense clouds of red dust which
rose up from what didn't even look
like a road.
As we approached our destination, we could see in the foreground
a simple round building with a
corrugated tin roof and a cross on
top. A few hundred yards behind it
was that geological spectacle called
the Great Rift escarpment. The
church was built, like everything
else, of wooden poles and mud, plastered over with a one or two inch
layer of cow dung. As we climbed
out of our Land Rovers, about thirty
women of all ages were forming a
semi-circle in front of that church,
singing and swaying to welcome us.
The men kept their distance for a
while, coming closer only after their
curiosity would no longer suffer the
distance. We had all assumed that
this would be a no-picture day, since
the Maasai were so well known for
their resentment of such impositions of western culture. But it
turned out otherwise. To our great
surprise and delight, the people of
Munjere gave us complete freedom
to use tape recorders and photography. They did so because our host
in this Arusha region of Tanzania
was Bishop Thomas Laiser, himself a
Maasai, and he accompanied us on
this visit. It was upon his recommendation that they indulged our
modern ways-besides, it gave them
great delight to see themselves on
instant replay in the view finder of
the hand-held camcorder.
The Maasai are an ethnic
group spread out over much of the
northern part of Tanzania and the
southern part of Kenya. They have
held out more firmly than any other
group in East Africa against assimilation by the forces of modernization.
Their herds of cattle are the focus
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and central symbol of this pastoralist
culture. Mixed into the herds of
cattle and serving somewhat more
practical purposes are large
numbers of goats and a few donkeys.
The Maasai cling tightly to their
pastoralist ways and refuse (except
for a few groups living near Arusha)
to take up the practice of agriculture, notwithstanding the gradual
limiting of grazing lands and the
hardship imposed by the unceasing
encroachment of modern society.
They are confident that Ngai
(Creator God) has given to them all
the cattle in the world, and so they
have traditionally justified their
cattle raids on other ethnic groups.
Ngai gave their first ancestor a cattle
stick, while he gave to the brother of
that ancestor a digging stick and
taught him to be a farmer.
The Maasai continue the traditional initiatory rites. They live in
polygamous families and hold rituals of reverence for their ancestors.
The young boys are sent out to care
for the family herd, and when I saw
them on those vast plains, I could
not help but think of little Joseph,
far from home, tending the flocks of
his father, Jacob. Even the part
about the lions killing him didn't
seem at all far-fetched out here in
the Serengeti. So, the many other
pastoral images from the Hebrew
and Christian Scriptures took on a
whole new meaning for me.
We stood at a respectful
distance and gave our attention to
the women's songs. After thirty
minutes or more of this, four men
came up from the cluster of huts
about fifty yards away bearing some
mysterious cargo and taking it inside
the church. Whatever that cargo,
we could see that it was covered with
large green leaves and through that
covering escaped a faint trail of
steam. We were asked to follow
them inside for the unveiling of the
cargo.
Missionary
Hitzler
announced that Bishop Laiser had
donated a steer from his own herd

for this occasion.
This was the premier gesture
to honor and welcome the
"distinguished delegation of scholars from North America" and to
thank the people of Munjere for
their hospitality in taking us into
their village. When the guests had
been fed and entertained, then the
people of the village would have
their feast. The African beef had
been cooked since early morning, in
the traditional Maasai manner, and
would now be served according to
custom. The host himself would cut
the first pieces from the steaming
chunk of meat; first he took one for
himself, as though to test its quality,
and then he shared with the leader
of the guest delegation. Then, we
all ate freely with our fingers. When
this sharing of the beef was well
along, other traditional dishes were
brought in, which we received as
best we could.
After all were well fed and the
calabash of curdled milk had been
passed like a common cup, we were
invited down to the engan 'g itself.
There, surrounded by a half dozen
or so traditional huts, we witnessed a
Maasai ritual, the jumping dance of
the morans, or warriors. The boys,
ages fourteen to eighteen, stood in a
semi-circle, and opposite them
stood the young girls ages nine to
eleven. Dressed in the traditional
red wrap-around clothing, with long
hair hanging in multiple braids and
spears in hand, the boys began their
chant. It was a unison buzzing
sound with a strong pulsating feel.
The girls stood facing them and
sang their own songs. One by one
the warriors stepped out into the
center and performed a triple vertical jump. Three times, in the
rhythm of the pulsation of their
warrior chant, they would leap high
into the air, hair braids flying high
over their heads, the third time
coming down with a great stomp.
The young prepubescent girls are
supposed to be much impressed
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and, who knows, they just might
marry one of these warriors in a
year or so.
While we witnessed this traditional ritual, Missionary Hitzler was
telling me about the traditional
sexual behavior of these groups and
the enormous threat which is posed
by the high incidence of venereal
diseases. The problem, according
to him, has been considerably worsened by the recent and fast moving
AIDS epidemic. He clearly implied
that the whole Maasai society could
soon be wiped out by this new
worldwide plague.
We left the village at the Great
Rift escarpment and returned to the
Missionary Hitzler residence. We
gathered in the lovely garden
behind their home, drank chai (the
Swahili word for tea) and enjoyed
the best fresh fruit we'd had since
we left home. There, accompanied
by the most beautiful wild bird
songs I'd ever heard, Bishop Laiser
presented us with a lecture, "How
the Church Respects Maasai
Culture." He offered a refreshingly
non-romantic view of the topic. Yes,
the church must respect the culture;
that is, it must not condemn it,
destroy it or manipulate its people.
But, neither should the church be a
priori committed to the value of
every aspect of Maasai culture, or
any other culture for that matter.
The church must try to discern
when and how to support and
preserve traditional cultural practices and when to take a more
prophetic stance, issuing the call for
change.
After we had returned to our
guest rooms in Arusha and had
taken an hour for supper at the
Safari Grill, we gathered for two
more lectures on Maasai culture.
One was delivered by Mary Laiser,
the Director of the Women's
Division of the Lutheran Church of
Tanzania, wife of the Bishop and a
rare Maasai woman who had
managed to receive the benefits of
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higher education. Western educated and fluent in English, she spoke
with a passion about the difficult
plight of women in Maasai culture.
She told how she had to be hidden
by teachers and friends already in
secondary school to prevent her
father from forcibly taking her back
to the family engan 'g. She told of
the harsh conditions of childbearing
and health care, of the ever present
shortage of water and of carrying it
for miles and miles.
Just two days later, after attending a Lutheran worship service in
Arusha, we piled into our Land
Rovers for a three day adventure
that provided almost more thrills
than a senior academic should pack
into that short a time. We drove
west from Arusha on the rough
roads, leaving behind us billowing
clouds of thick red dust. Finally,
nostrils smarting from the hot dry
dust, we arrived at our destination,
the Ngorongoro Crater Lodge.
There it was, perched at an altitude
of eight thousand feet on the edge
of this extinct volcano. From this
beautiful vantage point on the
crater's rim, we saw the near full
moon reflecting mirror-like from
the several large lakes three thousand feet below.
On that floor of the crater was
every form of East African wildlife,
just as we had so often seen it on the
PBS specials. The crater has, in
recent decades, become a famous
wildlife reserve, a playground for
photographic safaris for visitors
from all over the world, visitors like
us. We'd be visiting down there in a
couple of days. We watched our
breath make little clouds and we
shivered just a bit as the high altitude cold seeped through our
summer jackets. We hoped out loud
that our cottages were equipped
with heaters and heavy blankets to
keep us snug and warm through the
night; and indeed, it was so.
Living was "high" in this
modern lodge - in more ways than

one. It was not only five thousand
feet above the floor of the crater,
but even higher in its catering to
western predispositions for luxury.
The food and spirits were first class;
the crackling fireplace added a
warm glow to the whole scene, and
smiling black faces served with obvious attempt to please the tourist
"master's" every whim. I cannot say
I didn't enjoy it, but I was ambivalent about being a tourist on this
journey, and I couldn't push away
the thought that this was a lifestyle
invention of a few wealthy colonial
masters. Rare, indeed, is the African
who has access to such luxurious
indulgence.
Early morning saw us on the
red bumpy road to our first destination. It was a place I had read about
with fascination for many years, the
place where Mary and Louis Leakey
had found so many of the evidences
of the early hominids. We were
headed for Olduvai Gorge, quite
commonly regarded in our time as
the birthplace of the human race.
We visited the little museum, and
then drove down the winding road
into that geological wonder, created
by those same earth forces that
created the whole Great Rift fault.
There, we stood for a moment
before the marker which reads,
"The Skull of Australopithecus
Bosei (Zinjanthropus) was found
here by M.D. Leakey, July 17, 1959."
I stood there in silence, and my
imagination ran wild, like it always
does at places like this. I felt so
connected with my human ancestors of all time; I could hear their
crying and their laughing; I could
see their babies being born and
their dead being mourned. I felt a
wave of sympathy for their hardships
and gratitude for all their cultural
accomplishments. I suppose that's
an excessively roman tic way to
respond to such experiences, but,
for me, it is a reminder that most all
of what we are and have God has
given us through those who have
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come before us. It has some things
in common with our prayers of gratitude for the saints, only it reaches
back a little further in time and
includes the whole world in its
scope.
Mter a lunch that was elegantly spread out on the hoods of the
Land Rovers by the driver/guides,
we headed off over the Ngorongoro
highlands to find a village called
Olbalbal, the home of the "Man of
the Serengeti," Tepilit ole Saitoti. In
1972 the National Geographic
Society made a television film about
this man, a Maasai who managed
his way in to secondary school in
Tanzania and eventually to higher
education in the United States. For
fifteen years he lived in the US, and
then he heard the call of the
Ngorongoro highlands and the voices of his people calling him back to
be who he really was, a Maasai man.
Some years later, the National
Geographic Society made another
film about Saitoti, this one about his
return to Serengeti. That was in the
early eighties; and now, in the
summer of 1990, we drive across the
the Serengeti plains, hoping that
the Bishop's connections will pay off
again.
We followed a trail, rarely
recognizable as an automobile track;
we followed it as best we could in
roughly {the pun is intended) the
right direction. Every thirty minutes
or so, we'd spot a young Maasai boy,
out on those dry and dusty plains
watching over his family's herd.
Thanks to our driver, who knew
enough of the Maasai language to
communicate for necessities, we
were able to keep the train of Land
Rovers moving in the right di.rection. Finally, we arrived at Olbalbal,
the engan gofTepilit ole Saitoti.
Wearing a traditional garment
and carrying his cattle stick, he
came out to receive us. Almost
immediately, I noticed his shoes;
they were not the traditional
sandals, but the black dress shoes of
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his days in another culture - albeit
covered with dust and cow dung and
worn without socks. He led us up to
the top of a hill a quarter mile or so
from the village. "You see these
hills," he said, "the most beautiful
hill country in all the world. And
here the beef is - ah, delicious; not
sweet and soft like in Iowa, but a
little bit stronger and much better."
What stands out especially
about this encounter with Saitoti
was the wrenching dilemma of his
life. He said, with more than a
touch of pathos in his voice, "I am a
western person, like you. I lived in
the West for fifteen years and
earned a Bachelor's degree and a
Master's degree. I know how to go
out to fancy nightclubs, and I know
how to take hot showers and sleep
between linen sheets. I know all
that- but here I am, wearing these
poor old rags and trying sleep on
animal skins." On it went, his talk
about his personal dilemma and
that of his people, as modern and
national developments encroach
upon and multiply their hardships.
Where are these changes leading?
We sat on the ground at the
top of that hill, under a giant
baobab tree, carefully positioned
between cow pies, hanging on every
word that came out of the mouth of
this sage from two cultures. The
pain of the Maasai just wouldn't go
away after that; it became paradigmatic of the more general dilemma
of African peoples as they have
moved from their ethnic past into a
future way of life they can still
scarcely imagine . He walked us
through his engan g to see the huts
of his first and second wives and all
the other people of his extended
family. Then he took us to his
father's engan 'g a hundred yards
away. It may look romantic in the
big coffee table picture book
(Maasai, photographs by Carol
Beckwith, text by Tepilit ole Saitoti,
Harry Abrams Publishers, New York,
1980), but somehow it wasn't

roman tic that day. I saw children
with faces and bodies covered with a
solid layer of flies, eyes swollen and
sore, crying in their mothers' arms.
I saw people holding out their
hands for money, because even the
Maasai can no longer live apart
from the money economy of the
nation. Some of the women called
after us as we walked back to our
Land Rovers, and Saitoti explained,
"They want to know if anyone can
give them some aspirin. The little
girl has terrible headaches, and we
have no medicine." My fascination
for Maasai culture is all the greater,
but, somehow, it lost its romantic
edge that day.
The next day we did the regular tourist thing, taking a half-day
trip down into the Ngorongoro
Crater. As a photographic safari, it
was a total success. We saw them all
- lions, elephants, giraffes, wildebeasts and zebras by the thousands
and all the rest as well. But, that you
can always see on public television
specials.
Before returning to our base
at the guest house of the Arusha
Diocese, we visited the village of
Bashay. Here was a village model of
ujamaa, the special brand of socialism which was the hallmark of the
leadership of Julius Nyerere since
the time of independence. It meant
that people would band together in
somewhat compact villages to maximize cooperation and efficiency in
production, and the government
would bring such social services as
schools and medical clinics to the
people. We talked with an Mrican
Christian pastor, a political leader
and the doctors who ran a Lutheran
health center. Had the ideal of
ujamaa worked in this village? Yes, it
had helped to improve the availability of social services for the people;
but no, it had not fulfilled its
promise of economic improvement.
In our brief time at Bashay, as
on so many other occasions in these
several weeks, I found myself
The
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pleased with the social consciousness of the church. It seems that
church-operated health clinics and
hospitals are able to do a much
better job than the ones run by the
government. It is not that the
government clinics are not there; it
is just that most of them are seriously lacking in personnel and have
little or no medication to dispense.
What little technology they have is
likely to be in the back room and
out of operation for lack of spare
parts. It's the foreign connection,
the worldwide link of the church,
that makes the difference for the
churches' hospitals and clinics. It

was the same way with refugee
services and projects for bringing
safe water to communities. The
Lutheran Church of Tanzania
seemed to have both the will and
the know-how to do the job well.
Our visit to Bashay ended with
the church people serving us a
midday meal, one they had been
planning for three months. It was a
spread that would probably have
very few precedents in that village;
for after all, the distinguished scholars from North America had come
all this way to learn about their
village. When we thought we had
eaten well from the pots of rice and

vegetables, we were literally stunned
when four men walked into the
room carrying a whole roasted goat,
complete with hooves, head and a
handful of fresh green grass in its
mouth. This is now the second
animal that gave up its life just
because of our visit.
But in
Tanzania, hospitality knows no
bounds.
Tomorrow we'll board our
chartered bus and motor straight
north to Nairobi. The next day
we're supposed to fly across the
continent to Lagos, where a whole
adventure awaits us. 0

The Golden Bow

I sit at McDonald's and write sermons
Sipping on hot, weak coffee at a table greasy
And covered with residue from car and truck exhaust.
Plastic stir sticks help me swirl my artificial
Sweetener and non-dairy cream to a pleasing colorBrownish-in a white M-bossed styrofoam cup.
Cement-embedded chairs and tables show the wear
Of a billion Macs sold. Is it because of hunger
That people come to acquire blood-coagulating
Nounshment? The mimmum wage smile proclaiming
Come unto me all you who are, and I will give you rest.
Even the crows, a glossy black-blue, believe the
Rhetoric of the literate, and fly away to Popeye's
"Consummatum est."
Clyburn Duder
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Interesting Classics
Charles Vandersee

Dear Editor:
Finally someone has actually
said it.
Every time I see the "literary
canon" attacked or defended, or the
"great books" or the "classics of
Western civilization," I look for the
central issue in the argument, from
either side.
It's never there; instead, a
surfeit of pieties and grievances: We
need a canon because we have to
teach and transmit "the best that has
been known and said in the world,"
and the canon tells what that is. Or,
we gotta get rid of the canon,
because voices "marginalized" or
victims of "erasure" have as much
right to be heard as the "hegemonic" ones.
The piety/grievance battlefield
has called forth artillery from Roger
Kimball, Peter Shaw, ProfScam
Sykes, and others, volumes fierce
and metallic, attacking colleges and
universities for subverting the
Western heritage and succumbing
to "relativism." Standing for the

Charles Vandersee, at the University
of Virginia, has on his reading list this
spring Anne Dudley Bradstreet, Henry
Wadsworth Longfellow, and Ezra Loomis
Pound.
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other side might be Barbara
Herrnstein Smith, whose book
Contingencies of Value asks whether
people really know what they're talking about when they crave "intrinsic" and "objective" merit in certain
"classic" texts. Add Houston Baker
and Stanley Fish.
Can any of us bear much more
of this? Let me just stop here, and
congratulate Marjorie Perloff. This
Stanford literary scholar has actually, in print, specified the central
issue. She has actually used the
word "interesting," in a recent journal article, in her emphatic final
sentence. The texts we read and
therefore keep alive, and therefore
canonize, are those we find interesting!
Perloff was discussing two
stories, one by Ernest Hemingway,
"Mr. and Mrs. Elliot" (1924), and
one by Gertrude Stein, "Miss Furr
and Miss Skeene" (1922). Her
point, in American Literature
(December 1990), is that each story
is told with different ends in mind.
Stein, in her unheard-of ratchety
way, keeps repeating certain words
and phrases, until you're hypnotized, off-guard, mind sort of
scraped clean. Hemingway, by
contrast, wants to produce a further
specimen of the "well-made" tale,
doing nothing eccentric with
language, mainly wanting the story
just to hold together beautifully.
Avoiding scholarly equivoca-

tion, eschewing deconstructive indeterminacy, Perloff sides with Stein.
Holding it together, she concludes,
"is fmally much less interesting than
telling it again and again.'"
Hemingway's "classic Modernist
ideals" of unity and coherence are
not Art's final or most interesting
modes of operation.
Well, of course, this is problematic. Perloff knows this; everybody does. No one way of telling a
story is automatically more "interesting" than another. But a long-abandoned criterion has actually been
resurrected: Let's evaluate by
asking whether this story, and its
method, actually interests us! In
doing this, admit that once every
journeyman writer knows how to tell
a "well-made" story, that standard
achievement may well "interest" us
less.
I'll confess that what's interesting has been my own chief criterion
for years, deciding what to teach, in
a department mercifully large,
expectant, willing to entertain interesting literary strangers. And
doesn't my personal prejudice
happen to coincide with what we're
always talking about when we talk
about keeping a work in a "canon,"
or expelling it, or replacing it?
Whether it's the Ancrene Riwle or
the latest enigmatic Language
Poetry spread over the pages of
Sulfur, Temblor, or Paper Air. Won't it
survive only if enough intelligent
people get interested in it?
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What might I mean by this
word interesting? The temptation is
to go on at Gravity's Rainbow length,
but let's hear John Updike .
Recently reviewing a biography of
Theodore Dreiser, he found himself
admiring this synactically uncouth
philanderer, constructor of "novels
that in their crude honesty kept
offending those to whom the social
contract and its repressions were
sacred." (The New Yorker,Jan. 14)
What interests Updike, and
Dreiser's other readers then and
now, is Dreiser's acute avoidance of
posturing. Sister Carrie, who runs
off with a married man and ruins
his life, rises in the world and
becomes a New York stage celebrity.
Vice is rewarded, not uncommon in
life. Most intelligent readers find
this crude honesty immensely interesting. Other readers find interesting only the boldness of writers who
idealize-who lift up our streetprone minds into rooms with Bibles
and with citizens fully-clad, pure in
heart
I therefore attempt no rules or
doctrines about what's "interesting, "
except to assert one thing: even
Shakespeare has no hope of permanence if people, inside classrooms
and out, do not find him interesting. A moving passage in Eugene
O'Neill's deservedly much-revived
Long Day's Journey Into Nig!U addresses the Shakespeare question. Old
James Tyrone in that play is based
on James O'Neill, once the greatest
American actor of his day. Tyrone,
starved immigrant son, machinist,
never schooled, late in life tells his
spoiled son:
I studied Shakespeare as you'd study the
Bible. I educated myself. I got rid of an
Irish brogue you could cut with a knife.
I loved Shakespeare. I would have acted
in any of his plays for nothing, for the
joy of being alive in his great poetry.
March, 1991

Because other people feel that
way, Shakespeare and Shakespeare
festivals will survive .However,
Tyrone's son Edmund is interested
in Nietzsche, Ibsen, Marx, and
Shaw-and genuinely so, it seems.
Not an affectation. A cold moment
on the prairie occurs in Willa
Cather's 0 Piomers! as the rich but
unschooled rancher, Alexandra,
thinks with admiration of her
younger brother. He has gone to
the university, while her stodgy older
brothers had not "All his interests
they treated as affectations." There
is no explaining the genuine interests people have, and no accounting
for the fervor of their pursuit.
It's at a university that people
sometimes acquire these interests,
and indeed some texts survive only
in the oxygen tent of academia.
That kind of life support is essential
in the face of the difficulty and
recalcitrance of certain texts. My
sister, not the literary one in the
family, read Crime and Punishment
before I did, when we were both in
college, and let on that it was pretty
good. Older than she, I took the
book away from her and actually still
have it, the old Bantam paperback,
Constance Garnett's translation,
fourth printing. I agreed with her; it
was terrific. It will survive outside of
academia. Some of Faulkner will
too, but will much of Proust and
Melville? Thomas Pynchon yes, in
the realm of behemoth novels, but
William Gaddis? Paradise Losf? Uncle
Tom's Cabin?
So of course it matters what
teachers choose to teach. They
simply have to assign and discuss
some things that students will not
delve into on their own. And civilization will not collapse if you pretty
much trust English professors to
teach what interests them. Most of
us are actually human, not given to
affectations. Like other intelligent

people (even some students), we are
unable, on literary grounds, to "do"
much with trivia, narrow piety,
screamy politics, unrelieved scum,
fatuous journalese, formula writing,
tales told by flat-earth promoters,
verses launched by the likes of
Adam Smith or Betty Crocker.
If English professors on occasion insert into the reading list a
Stephen King or Dashiell Hammett,
you can generally assume they want
to do some serious pedagogy: Why
isn't this book a "classic"? What d9
we think we're talking about when
we say something is or isn't "worth"
serious attention?
Even so, isn't there the danger
that students of the present generation will be deprived of Hemingway,
because teachers, tired of beautiful
form and style, are now shoving the
ample Miss Stein down unready
throats? Seekers of the perverse will
flock to this force-feeding scenario,
but the truth about what's "interesting" is that Hemingway has a little
too much going for him to sacrifice.
His totality of merits constitutes an
irresistible power. For Perloff's
nonce purpose he seems stuffy,
beautiful form and style as a sort of
affectation, but I don't read her as
disputing his place in literary history and the curriculum.
The seekers of the perverse
remain on the prowl, however,
gnashing over who is being asked to
devour what. Because they have
lately been so fierce, in books and
magazine pieces,newspaper columns
and even 1V, perhaps a brief caveat
is called for. Why might you not
want to believe quite everything you
hear, from the surly Right?
Chiefly because such gadflies
and their godfather Allan Bloom
have adopted a clever tactic: charging academia with their own
mischief, which is to say "politiciz21

ing" the university. The surly Right
has brought into and against the
university the power ploys of fear,
stasis, and arrogance.
Fear is now being demanded
of any of us who establish courses
and reading lists. We're sternly told
to be afraid of ourselves. It seems
we're no longer capable of making
just and honorable decisions about
what's interesting. Have we overdone it-too much reading and
study in our lives, resulting in brai.n
rot? Give in to that fear-incipient
in anyone honest-that you're
losing your modest talent for reading and teaching.
Stasis means wait for "posterity" to render its "verdict," as if writers are by definition an indicted
species. No one "today" knows what
works of "permanent value" will
have survived Time's winnowing.
Let's pretend that nothing interesting is being produced today-that
novelists and poets and playwrights
should wait for "classroom adoption" until they're senior citizens.
Also, while keeping the reading list as it was in the days of Our
Miss Brooks, let's have no digging
up of "forgotten" makers of things
to read.
Especially female,
vanquished, or hued. By perverse
and contradictory logic, if they were
buried in their own time, there's no
reason for us, their posterity, to give
them a fresh look. And be sure to
require no readings that might be
"controversial," since it's either too
late or too early, these years of 18 to
22, for American college students to
form judgments of their own.
Arrogance among the surly
Right means that one of those occasional imperial moments is upon us,
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when a few individuals angry and
culturally resentful confuse their
sweat of anxiety with the oil of kingly anointment. They and only
they-pontificating columnists, religious lobbyists, federal panderers--know what texts are culturally
meritorious, thank you. They've
found that the louder and more
often they whine, the more the
media think something new and
terrible is happening.
The arrogators exploit the
natural and inevitable (even comic)
dissonance between media and
academia. The premise of academia
is that it takes time and calm paragraphs to think, while the premise
of the popular media is that instant
comment, with exclamation points,
represents reality. So when gadflies
claim-by scurrilous anecdote and
hyperbole-to discover the academy
festering, those flies get lots of
column inches but insufficient
critique.
Of these three political strategies, the strategy of fear embraces
all. Be afraid of your own expertise,
teachers are advised. Learn fear of
posterity, of controversy, of the
media. Get afraid that the public is
mobilizing to smash anyone appearing indictable or even accessorial.
Just capitulate.
I speak not having an ox being
gored but as an observer of this
aggressive politicizing. Politics can
be an entertainment, but teachers
and scholars determined, as they
should be, to take works interesting-in the largest and most significant senses--and bring them before
students, are justified in finding
politics of the surly Right more and
more of an invasion.

You might want to follow up,
and a summary and critique, in an
obscure magazine, helpfully amplifies. I haven't drawn on him here,
but Donald Lazere, in Profession 89,
a publication of the Modern
Language Association, does something as fresh and startlingly sensible as Marjorie Perloff does.
Finding writers like Jonathan
Yardley (Washington Post), David
Brooks (Wall Street Journal), and
James Atlas (New York Times
Magazine) tarring or indicting
certain universities and teachers of
literature, Lazere actually investigated. On what grounds, this bashing?
He pursued by letter and
phone the sources cited by these
flies, and got after the flies themselves, inquiring, closing in. The
result is his indictment of the
indicters, for "lurid accusations
calculated to maximize publicity;
evaluating expressions of the opposing side with malice aforethought,
deliberately putting the worst light
on every statement and refusing to
acknowledge any valid points; ...
uncritically accepting secondhand
accounts from sources biased
toward one's own side," and so on.
What he found sure sounds
like politics, a little deeper in the
gutter than usual, perhaps almost
interesting enough to draw into the
curriculum itself, on the reasonable
ground that Shakespeare, Faulkner,
and Stein are writing in and of a
real world and not beyond it

From Dogwood, faithfully yours,

c.v.
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Times to Try the Soul
Reno Juneja

In the Indian epic The
Mahabharatha, not merely a literary
work of art but preeminently a
source of religious precepts and
moral values, the forces of good are
about to undertake a war with the
evil empire. And yet even here
good and evil, right and wrong, are
not so easily demarcated. Prince
Arjuna, the supreme warrior without whom the army of good would
be crippled, is reluctant to take up
arms even though as a member of
the warrior class to fight for good is
his dharma , his moral and religious
obligation. The enemy are his
brothers (He is indeed fighting his
uncle and cousins). To what end is
this war being fought? Is it worth it?
He is persuaded to join the battle by
Lord Krishna, god incarnate.
Detach yourself from emotion, Lord
Krishna tells .AJjuna, and follow the
path of virtue disinterestedly.
Difficult choices cannot be escaped,
nor can one allow oneself to be
paralyzed into inaction, into an
abdication of duty, when confronted
by competing goods.
Renu Juneja is a regular contributor to
The Nation column. A member of the
VU Department of English since f 978,
her p~ofessional interests in English
Renazssance theatre have shifted to
greater concern with colonial literatures
particulalrly in the Caribbean.
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America today is the reluctant
warrior, but we have no god right
here amidst us, no set of clearly
established and universally held
beliefs, to help resolve our ethical
dilemma. President Bush, in his
address to the nation on the night
of the opening of hostilities, quoted
Thomas Paine: "These are the times
that try men ' s souls." They are
indeed, but perhaps not quite in the
way, or only in the way, President
Bush used the words. He was referring to the pain and suffering associated with the blood and carnage of
war, the loss of lives of not only our
own sons and daughters but also of
ordinary Iraqis whom we have no
reason to wish ill. But the nation's
soul is also being tried because we
are uncertain about the good of this
war. Most Americans have, for the
moment, endorsed the war, but
there has been enough questioning
and protest to suggest that
Americans have swallowed hard and
made a decision not willingly but
almost as if trapped by uncontrollable events, not choosing the
greater good but resigning themselves to the lesser evil in a slate of
bad choices.
Is it because Americans have
become squeamish about war in
general, no longer possessing, as
Saddam Hussein implies, the nerve
to go to war? Or is our squeamishness, shaped by memories of
Vietnam, reserved for a particular
kind of war? As a recent immigrant,
I have no direct memories of the
agony of Vietnam, a condition I

share with my students. With them I
have begun to explore our responses to war, this war, all wars. As it
happens, in my various classes I am
teaching Beowulf, Sir Gawain and the
Green Knight, Thomas Hobbes'
Leviathan, and Thomas More's
Utopia and these works have provided a context for our self-probings.
Few of us, I find, are genuine pacifists believing that the use of force
in any situation would be immoral.
Yet, very few of us are willing to
subscribe fully to any Hobbesian
conception of human nature as
inherently aggressive or to its
Freudian versions of the dark, irrational psyche never fully contained
by the forces of civilization. Freud
had suggested in a 1932 letter to
Einstein prompted by the League of
Nations International Institute of
Intellectual Cooperation that
personal aggression and war as a
social manifestation were outcomes
of the same drives. (Freud did
concede that cultural development
could bring us to the point where
war is eradicated.) Hobbes' state of
nature postulates an inherent
competitiveness in humans which
would keep them in perpetual
conflict but for the coercive force of
the laws of a civil state. While
humans have moved out of this
"natural" state of warfare, we could
perceive the nation states themselves as existing in a Hobbesian
state of nature in relationship to
each other. Both views would
suggest that we resign ourselves (in
lieu of a superpower to police the
world) to war as a permanent and
23

frequently recurring feature of
human existence. In which case
one deals with war as it erupts
rather than agonizing about its
rightness and wrongness.
As we try to come to terms
with this war, as we ponder over the
religious, economic, cultural causes
for violent conflicts, we begin to see
that for us such conflicts, particularly those between sovereign states,
are not fuelled, for the most part, by
instincts or psychological drives.
There may or may not be a "natural"
inclination to rely on force in order
to secure what we desire, but at least
in the case of war we do not
succumb to this. "natural" instinct to
use force without careful pondering
about the consequences. For that
· matter, we see peaceful cooperation
as also a natural form of behavior.
This is not to deny that war can
become a psychological necessity for
a nation. To some measure, this war
had become a psychological necessity not only for a president who is
trying to live down his wimpish
image or live up to the machismo of
his football and navy career but also
for many American people who see
themselves taunted by a bully, chickening out in a game of chicken, and
losing their pride in standing tall.
Certainly, war must have become a
psychological necessity for Saddam
Hussein whatever else its "objective"
reasons. The rhetoric of the Great
Satan indicates that for Saddam
Hussein and for many other Arabs
(even those like the Palestinians for
whom we feel such sympathy)
America has become a scapegoat to
cover, perhaps deny, internal frustrations and national and ethnic hist<:r
ries in which they have been agents
as well as victims.
Nevertheless, my students and
I ask ourselves, specially as we read
Beowulf, is not war, the kind of war
we are fighting, as much a learned
behavior as an jnstinctive one? So
much of our heritage that I teach
and my students learn valorizes war
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or rather valorizes the virtues that
are honed in war. It is easy to
condemn popular fare on TV, from
He Man cartoons to he-man detective shows, for fueling our inclinations for violence, but so many of
the classics of the Western tradition
I teach in my courses depict war as
the appropriate arena for testing
courage, manhood, human skill and
intellect, and even our very humanity. If the humanity of the heroes
and heroines of my texts were tested
by the ethics of ahimsa (nonviolence) would we conceive of
courage and manhood and humanity differently? So much of human
behavior is learned rather than
instinctive; that is one of the ways we
differ from animals with whom so
much behavior is instinctive. Why
should we assume that the animal
part of us overrides the human part
or that the aggressiveness of chimpanzee is the behavioral model within which we remain trapped?
In his essay, "The Role of
Expectancy," Gordon Allport writes
"While some serious and basic
conflicts of interest may be unavoidable, warlike solutions spring always
from warlike expectancies and
preparations" (187). Have we been
thrust into this war by a President
trapped by his rhetoric of war, a
rhetoric, for instance which personalizes the war and the enemy so that
it is difficult for the President to
step back? Had we not so rapidly
landed our army into the Middle
Eastern desert, could peaceful solutions have stood a better chance? If
we threaten war then we had better
fight the war, and if we have to fight
let us fight on our own terms.
These two months are the best suited for this desert war, so if the hostilities have to begin let them begin
now. Were the sanctions indeed not
working? And even if they were not
working would more time have
permitted the development of other
than warlike solutions? I have
wondered now as before if the pres-
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ence of armies in nations, even
when only maintained for selfdefense, does not eventuate the likelihood of warlike solutions to
conflicts.
After the success of the nonviolent struggle to achieve independence we might have assumed that
India had internalized the value of
ahimsa as a tested alternative to
violence. Yet, since independence
India has been involved in four
wars. The one with the Chinese
could be termed a genuine selfdefense but still one fought over a
barren and inaccessible piece of
land. Two with Pakistan over
Kashmir and the new eruption of
violence in Kashmir suggests that
wars have not provided and will not
provide a resolution. The last war
was undertaken to liberate a neighbor where India had actually fuelled
the insurgency because the regime
being thrown offwas India's favorite
enemy. The doctrine of nonviolence is apparently no curb on a
nation with an army.
Gandhi had no nation and no
national army at his disposal. He
did indeed shape an army out of his
nonviolent fighters whose success
demanded training and self-discipline comparable to that of the
soldier using the weapons of
violence. But does nonviolent struggle provide a viable alternative only
when the powers in conflict, as with
Gandhi and with Dr. King, are
people within a state in conflict
with the ruling power and not as
with us today two sovereign states in
conflict? Civil disobedience will
work only when a state has been
conquered; it will not prevent
conquest Once Iraq had occupied
Kuwait, the people of Kuwait,
instead of looking for military help,
could have practiced civil disobedience. What would be the likelihood
of success of such a venture? Do the
tactics of going slow and paralyzing
the work of governing not demand
a fairly large state where the rulers
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are indeed dependent on the labor
and goodwill of the ruled? What if,
as with Kuwait, the workers could be
supplanted by vast numbers of Iraqis
who have flooded the state?
But, of course, even the most
shrewd and pragmatic practitioners
of non-violence like Gandhi and
King have argued for this alternative
to war on moral not utilitarian
grounds. Nonviolent struggles are
based on the assumption that the
good will overcome the evil, where
the value system of the oppressor
will be transformed by the force of
the good. Such a faith assumes that
all humans, even those engaged in
cruel oppression, have within them
this spark of human decency which
can ultimately be ignited. Would
not such assumptions have been
utterly misplaced with the Nazis or
with Stalin as they evidently were
not with the British and Americans?
Are there not some situations where
the costs of non-violence are unacceptably high?
The vocabulary of costs takes
us away from the realm of arguments made in absolute terms
where war is morally abhorrent no
matter what the good or goods that
were to be obtained by war. I think
most Americans think in terms of
costs when assessing the worth of
war. That is why rallies opposing
this war have carried placards like
the following: "Is Saddam worth it?"
"No blood for oil. " In general ,
Americans accept the paradox that
wars can be fought to achieve
justice. What they have sought to be
persuaded about is whether this war
is necessary and whether the war is
just.
By what criteria are we
persuaded that this is indeed a just
war? First we have to be persuaded
that it is our war. Why should we
have to fight for Kuwait and even
Saudi Arabia? Certainly not for the
price of oil or perhaps even for the
flow of oil. No one really believes
that the price or flow of oil would be
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radically affected if Saddam Hussein
was controlling Kuwaiti oil. We
might, however, fear that he could
use his control of oil as a tool for
blackmail to establish his hegemony
over the Arab world. If this were
our only fear would we be right in
committing ourselves to the evil of
war for the fear of a future evil
which has not yet taken place?
I think a little more than our
so called "vital" interests should be
involved if we are to undertake the
evil of war. Wars in the past have, of
course, been fought and defended
as morally justified when undertaken to secure material advantages
and needs. In class, when I raised
questions about the moral justifiability of such wars during our discussions of More's Utopia, my students
were perplexed to fmd that even the
Utopians endorsed wars for such
reasons. The Utopians "absolutely
loathe war" ; they see it as "subhuman" ; they are "practically the only
people on earth who fail to see
anything glorious in it" (109). But
they will go to war for several
reasons: In self-defense; "to repel
invaders from friendly territory, or
to liberate the victims of dictatorship-which they do in a spirit of
humanity, just because they feel
sorry for them. However, they give
military support to 'friendly
powers', not only in defensive wars,
but also in attempts to make
reprisals for acts of aggression ....
Their idea of an adequate causus
belli includes more than robbery by
force of arms. They even take
stronger action to protect the right
of traders who are subjected to legal
injustice in foreign countries" (109).
Indeed, the dirty tricks of the
CIA which have often embarrassed
the more "upright" citizens of this
country are quite acceptable to the
Utopians as a means of fighting a
just war. Utopian secret agents will
bribe to kill key individuals, and
offer generous take-over bids to
overthrow the enemy. They have

calculated costs and have decided
that it is unquestionably humane to
avoid killing large numbers by using
any form of chicanery that will
work. If today we are less sanguine
about undertaking such wars it is
perhaps due less to any deep disapproval of the moral logic followed
by Utopians and more due to our
awareness that we lack the moral
certainty of the Utopians. The
rights and wrongs of our world are
so much more complicated. Thus,
while it is easy enough to condemn
the barbarity and cruelty of Saddam
Hussein, we are forced to remember that we cheerfully supported
this same man in the recent past. In
such situations, it is impossible to
claim righteous moral indignation.
When we hear of protests in favor of
Iraq in the Muslim world, we are
also forced to acknowledge our
ignorance, forced to sift through
distortions in perspective, through
hostile conceptions and group
stereotypes.
Perhaps in a war such as this
one there is no clear and just course
to take, no way of responding that is
entirely right or entirely free of the
responsibility of evil. Like the
Utopians, we feel compelled to go
to the aid of our allies, which is why
we rushed to defend Saudi Arabia.
Our friends asked for this help, and
this obligates us morally. Our
response was of course politically
pragmatic as well allowing the
President to show his mettle and
allowing us to establish that we
stand by our commitments. But, of
course, it is one thing to send troops
to defend Saudi Arabia against
possible and even likely aggression,
quite another to set out to liberate
Kuwait by force. We believe that in
taking up arms against an aggressor
like Saddam Hussein we have moral
principle on our side. But the question remains-how far does our
moral obligation to intervene
extend? Should we be rushing into
Lithuania? Do we see ourselves as a
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police force patrolling the world?
No, not after Vietnam.
But just as there is something
morally, and politically, questionable
about rushing around imposing our
ideals, or interfering in the conduct
of sovereign states, there is also
something questionable in which we
essentially turn our back to the
world and say that we don't want to
be involved because this does not
affect us directly. If my family, my
nation were attacked, I would go
and fight, but not for those
strangers across the world. By this
logic, if the Nazis had not moved
beyond the borders of the Third
Reich, they could have continued to
murder the Jews. If Sad dam
Hussein had marched into Kuwait
and intended to occupy it to exploit
it, but we could be sure that he
would do so without continual
violence, terrorism, and enslavement, perhaps then we could say
that the Kuwaities have a right to
resist but it would not be wrong for
us to help in appeasing Iraq. But to
turn away as things stand may well
be a failure to resist evil.
One of the strongest arguments I have heard in favor of this
war comes from those who argue
that nothing will stop Hussein, so
that if we don't fight him now we
will have to fight him later at far
greater costs. And these costs would
include not just human life but also
environmental damage should
Hussein secure capacity for nuclear
arms. There would be costs as well
in terms of the tenuous geo-political
order because if Hussein, seeing
himself as a liberator of the Arab
world, had attacked Israel without
our presence in the the region to
contain Israel and to keep the
present alliances intact, the dangers
of escalating warfare would also be
far greater. Hence it is that some
experts use the notions of preemptive and surgical strikes. As the
Utopians well understood, cost
remains an important factor in such
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moral decisions. We are always
faced with issues of proportionality
when weighing justice, at least in the
gray, complicated moral realm of
ordinary human beings if not in the
morally clearer world of saints.
When someone says that the results
of war will always be worse than
refusal to go to war, that is still the
language of costs and not of idealIsm.
Of course, how we weigh
consequences is also not entirely
clear. It is seldom a matter of simply
measuring the cost in terms of
human lives and human suffering.
Greater numbers of lives were
perhaps lost in the second World
War than if the Third Reich had
been allowed to go its own way. One
of the necessary conditions of initiating a just war according to the just
war theorists is proportionality: that
the war itself not produce more evil
than the good it achieves. It is also a
condition for waging war- that is,
we do not engage in a conflict, even
one not initiated by us, if the expected results will outweigh the good,
however important this particular
good. The problem today is that
modern technology of war has made
such calculations difficult if not
impossible. When the Utopians
went to war they too would have had
to consider the possible harm to
non-combatants. And they could,
perhaps, have satisfied themselves
with the so-called notion of double
effect which postulates that the
death of innocents is excusable if
this is not the direct and intended
effect of the war. It is merely an
unfortunate side effect. But with
the current technology for nuclear
warfare and our capacity to produce
total holocaust, the notion of
double effect becomes a somewhat
academic and moot question.
Indeed, theorists like Michael
Walzer have argued that with the
possibility of war escalating to
include nuclear annihilation we are
faced with a "monstrous immorality

. . . an immorality we can never
hope to square with our understanding ofjustice in a war" (282). In the
case of the present war, even if we
can be certain that we will avoid
such an escalation we are still left
with a great uncertainty about the
consequences so that some may
legitimately argue that the only just
action would be to avoid war.
I know that many Americans
have supported this war in the faith,
or at least the hope, that this will be
a quick war and that if the war were
to drag itself out, the conflict escalating with time rather than diminishing like Vietnam, our opinion
polls would begin to reflect unease
with and disapproval of the war.
Merleau-Ponty argues in Humanism
arul Terror; that when we engage in
actions which involve doing something wrong or evil in order to do
good, our guilt often depends on
the success or failure of the action.
We have to begin with (as in the
case of this war) such a high degree
of uncertainty about results of our
actions; in such cases we can live
with the wrong done without guilt if
the outcome is good. To the pacifist convinced about the wrongness
of all war, this is faulty thinking. But
for the majority of the American
people, success or failure will determine what they feel about the war.
For all their moral rhetoric,
Americans on the whole remain
pragmatists at heart. They would be
quite willing to accept Hamlet's
paradoxical formulation to his
mother when he lashes out at her
for marrying Claudius: I am being
cruel to be kind. (Walzer cites this
familiar defense in his chapter on
"Dirty Hands," 72.)
Nevertheless, we Americans
must consider the possibility that
even if we win this war, and quickly,
so that the criterion of proportionality is satisfied, we might still not be
able to account our winning a
success. When using Utopia to initiate a discussion of our war, I had
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asked my students if they believed
that wiping out Saddam Hussein
would be an entirely successful resolution to the Middle East conflict.
The immediate context for this
question was our discussion of
More's critique of capital punishment for the crime of thieving.
Thomas More mounts both a moral
and a pragmatic argument against
the use of capital punishment:
killing is immoral and it is an ineffective deterrent against this crime.
More's analysis of why capital
punishment is an ineffective deterrent has him exploring the social
and political causes of thieving .
Crime is not caused by the sinful
and evil nature of humans but by
specific social causes which the solution does not address. My students
were quick to apply the analogy to
the present war. To single out
Saddam Hussein as the great evil, to
root the problem entirely in his
character, is to fail to undertake a
systemic analysis of the situation.
For Saddam Hussein the raising of
the Palestinian question may merely
have been a ploy, but the Palestinian
question remains, as do other causes
of present Arab dissatisfaction.
Given Saddam Hussein's act of
aggression, initiation of war may still
have been a necessary action. To be
entirely convinced of the necessity
of the war we must, however, be
entirely sure that war was indeed the
last resort. Some of us are worried
that we have allowed ourselves to be
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cornered into a war by allowing
ourselves to be trapped by a
sequence of threats and counterthreats, by not allowing ourselves
to fully explore diplomatic initiatives
and peaceful solutions. Yes, there
was a scurrying of diplomats to and
fro but always within too tense and
vitiated an atmosphere to promise
success. In a very western way, we
seemed to feel that time was escaping us, that we had to set quick
deadlines to achieve our goals-as if
we must settle for a quick war if we
could not achieve a quick peace.
But if history teaches us anything, it
is that what looms as an urgent and
gargantuan threat today may well
appear as unimportant from the
longitudinal perspective.
But if we were and are entirely
convinced that this menace had to
be halted quickly before it spread, if
the medicinal metaphors of surgical
strikes are indeed appropriate, then,
I think, for all our horror of war, we
should get on with the business,
much like St. Augustine's soldier
who understood both that his war
was just and that killing even in a
just war is a terrible thing to do.
Just because moral discriminations
are difficult we should not abandon
the act of moral discrimination. Just
because choice seems so difficult in
this immensely complicated modern
world, we should not abandon
choice. Let us, Hamlet-like, admit
our guilt in being cruel and live with
it. But let us not, like Hamlet, worry

so endlessly about whether to act or
not to act that we cause as much if
not more carnage by our inability to
act. Let me end by quoting Michael
Walzer once again: "In our myths
and vision, the end of war is also the
end of secular society. Those of us
trapped within that history, who see
no end to it, have no choice but to
fight on, defending the values to
which we are committed, unless or
until some alternative means of
defense can be found" (329). Could
nonviolent resistance have been
that alternative means in this
instance? I don't think so. Could
there have been less warlike solutions? Perhaps. There seems to be
no easy, certain choice here for
many of us. Since the nation has
made a choice, let us pray for a
successful resolution.O
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American Dreams
Edward Byrne
Almost all serious stories in the
world are stories of a failure with a death
in it. But there is more lost paradise in
them than defeat. To me that 's the
central theme in ~stern culture, the lost
paradise.

-Orson Welles
Where have you gone, Joe
DiMaggio1
Our nation turns its lonely eyes to
you.
-from "Mrs. Robinson"

--Simon and Garfunkel

As the first few months of 1991
begin to unfold and the disheartening events of the new year start to
accumulate like so many shadowy
clouds across a threatening sky, one
searches for safe haven, wherever it
may be found, in an attempt to
provide a barrier against the anxiety
of the moment. Some newspaper
columnists have noted the greater
attendance recorded at churches

Edward Byrne, who teaches in the
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regularly publishes poetry in a variety of
journals.
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and synagogues across the country
as evidence of Americans' increased
interest in religion. Other social
commentators have remarked upon
the newly found closeness displayed
by members of many communities
whose ties to one another have been
symbolized by the yellow ribbons
encircling a large number of the
nation's trees, especially in those
towns or cities where military bases
are located and the families of
service personnel assigned overseas
duties still live. In addition, various
film critics have published articles
crediting the troubling times for the
surprising success of "escapist films"
such as Pretty Woman, Ghost, or Home
Alone. However, one might discover
some sense of security in another
sort of diversion.
Annually, as Hollywood begins
its countdown of days to the
Academy Awards ceremonies, film
enthusiasts avert their attention
from the troubling concerns of the
moment to take a nostalgic look at
movies and artists of the past that
have earned the respect of Oscar, or
to reconsider films and filmmakers
that have been spurned by Oscar.
This year, just such a backward
glance seems more appropriate than
ever, as the film industry will mark
the 50th anniversary of the opening
of Citizen Kane, directed by Orson
Welles.
No film in cinema history has
received as much praise and adulation as Citizen Kane. Throughout
the decades since its opening in July
of 1941, Citizen Kane has been
revered by critics, scholars, and film
buffs as the best film ever made.
More has been written about this
movie-its script, its cast, its production problems, its historical significance, its social commentary, its critical reception, and, of course, its
director-than about any other
work since the invention of celluloid
film. Citizen Kane is the dominant
example used to illustrate filmmaking at its finest in courses of film
appreciation, film criticism, or film

production.
Even literature
anthologies published for use in
college English courses, such as
Oxford University Press's Elements of
Literature, include Citizen Kane alongside the other works of great literature that have helped define our
culture. An international poll of
more than 120 film critics conducted every decade by Sight & Sound,
the official film journal of the
British Film Institute, continually
ranks Citizen Kane as the greatest
film ever made. In fact, the survey
for the 1980s indicated Citizen Kane's
lead position was stronger than ever
and the status of Orson Welles more
solid, as he received more votes than
any other as the greatest director in
cinema history.
Nevertheless, as the 1991
Academy Awards draw near, one is
reminded of the controversial treatment Citizen Kane and its director
received at the Oscar ceremonies
honoring the films of 1941. Citizen
Kane had been universally praised by
critics like John O'Hara, Gilbert
Seldes, and Archer Winsten, as a
truly great landmark film-in the
words of Time magazine, "the most
sensational product of the U.S.
movie industry." Only those newspapers and magazines owned by
William Randolph Hearst, on whom
Kane's character is transparently
based, declined to join the parade
offering acclaim. Earlier, Hearst
had attempted to buy the negatives
of the film's master copy, offering to
meet any price, in order to destroy
the picture. In addition, the
premiere of Citizen Kane, originally
scheduled for Valentine's Day of
1941, had to be cancelled because
Hearst had threatened the film
distributors and theatres with retribution. Only after a lawsuit brought
by Hearst against RKO failed did the
studio release the film for public
showings-although the studio did
limit the film's screenings.
Citizen Kane received nine
Academy Awards nominations (Best
Picture,Director, Actor, Screenwriter,
The Cressel

Editor, Cinematographer, Decorator,
Score, Sound), but was honored
only for its screenplay. As many
publications have demonstrated
throughout the last five decades,
most prominently The Citizen Kane
Book by Pauline Kael, Oscar Dearest by
Peter H. Brown and Jim Pinkston,
and Marion Davies by Laurence
Guiles, Orson Welles and his film
were victimized by the social politics
of the time. As Brown and Pinkston
point out in their book, "Welles's
Oscar K.O. was a political defeat,
not an artistic one, and that knockout was sealed the minute
Hollywood realized that the
doomed, alcoholic mistress in
Citizen Kane was meant to be Marion
Davies," Hearst's mistress and a
mainstay of the Hollywood social
scene. The film community, in
denying Welles the recognition he
deserved, succumbed to pressures to
hold to a politically expedient line
rather than to honor the fllm on the
basis of its artistic merit. As columnist Hedda Hopper declared at the
time, the Academy was willing to
honor "almost any other fllm except
Citizen Kane."
The atmosphere at the
Academy Awards was so filled with
rancor that each time a nomination
for Citizen Kane was announced,
boos and hisses could be heard
throughout the auditorium. Even
the awarding of an Oscar for the
screenplay, which Welles was forced
to share with co-writer Herman J.
Mankiewicz, was a slap in the face
for Orson Welles, since many in the
community considered Welles's
credit for the scriptwriting as undeserved and saw this as an opportunity to display support for Mankiewicz
over Welles.
At the time of the Academy
Awards, Welles already was preparing two new films for RKO, The
Magnificent Ambersons and It's All
True. However, the studio, caving in
to the political pressures brought
about by the Hollywood community,
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withdrew its support of Welles's
artistic freedom. While Welles was
out of the country, RKO cut forty
minutes from The Magnificent
Ambersons and attached an inferior
ending to the film previous to its
release. Welles would later declare:
"They let the studio janitor cut The
Magnificent Ambersons in my
absence." (Nevertheless, many critics still believe The Magnificent
Ambersons, even with the poor editing by the studio, to be as accomplished as Citizen Kane.) Furious at
the studio's interference, Welles
turned his back on Hollywood
rather than compromise his artistic
vision. As an indication of his
disdain for the studio system and
the members of the film community,
Welles remarked: "Hollywood is a
golden suburb, perfect for golfers,
gardeners, mediocre men, and
complacent starlets." The second
film, It's All True, rumored to be a
remarkable film as well, was never
released by RKO. Stored in the
studio vaults for years, the only print
of the film was eventually destroyed.
When Welles exiled himself
from Hollywood to Europe in order
to preserve his artistic integrity, he
lost the financial backing needed to
create films. Unlike other artists
who simply need a paint brush, or a
pen, or a pair of ballet slippers, or a
musical instrument, a filmmaker
cannot produce without substantial
funding,which-in today's world-is
measured in millions of dollars.
Ironically, Welles's life imitated his
art so closely that many fans of film
began to confuse Welles with Kane,
somehow blending the fates of these
two tragic heroes. Like Kane, Welles
represented the man who had spent
his early years achieving the success
that exemplifies the American
Dream, a contemporary version of
paradise, only to spend his later life
confronting his loss of paradise and
its accompanying pain.
In the same year that Citizen
Kane was released, two other events,

one in the summer and the other in
the winter, occurred which, oddly
enough, might be connected with
the reminiscence of Welles's
triumph and fall. In the summer of
1941, the New York Yankees' Joe
DiMaggio strung together his
record streak of batting safely in 56
consecutive games. Recently, New
York Times sports columnist Dave
Anderson declared that DiMaggio's
feat represented "baseball's most
majestic record" and that it was
"held by its most majestic personality." In the same manner that
Anderson identifies DiMaggio with
1941 in the world of sports, film critics identify Welles and Citizen Kane
with 1941 in the world of cinema.
However, the baseball community
will celebrate the 50th anniversary
of The Yankee Clipper's accomplishments over and over this summer
with a sense of pride and honor,
since Joe DiMaggio has remained a
cherished figure throughout the
decades, embraced by the sport to
which he contributed so much. At
the same time, one wonders what
amount of guilt and sadness instead
will be felt by those members of the
film community, particularly the
older figures of the Hollywood
establishment, who belatedly will
celebrate Citizen Kane and Orson
Welles this year.
Perhaps, some might argue, a
better baseball comparison to Welles
would be Pete Rose, who holds the
National League record for batting
safely in consecutive games and who
has just been banned from consideration for Cooperstown's Hall of
Fame. Like Welles, Rose had
attained the American Dream and
then lost it, finally exiled by the
ruling establishments of his profession; however, Rose's exile has
occurred after the achievements of
a full and enriching career. Film
critics will always wonder what great
works Welles might have produced
had the politics of Hollywood not
turned against him in mid-career.
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To extend the baseball metaphor
one step further, Welles, therefore,
could be compared to Shoe less Joe
Jackson of the 1919 Chicago White
Sox, the young phenom among the
players banned from baseball for
gambling on the World Series, ironically immortalized in filmgoers'
minds by a recent movie, Field of
Dreams.
The other event that also characterizes 1941 is the December 7th
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor,
which brought the United States
into a war its people had tried
thraWout
the
year
to
ignore-perhaps praying it would
just go away. Many historians have
written of the oppressive presence
of the news from the European
warfront on the daily lives of
Americans in 1941. Most citizens
were fearful of their nation's imminent entry into the conflict, but all
were hoping there would be some
way to avoid joining the battle. In
the summer of 1941,Joe DiMaggio's
extended batting streak offered
Americans something to follow from
day to day in their newspapers other
than the battle victories or losses in
Europe and the spreading threat of
Hitler's forces. In contrast, Citizen
Kane reminded Americans of the
dangers represented by power and
greed. DiMaggio extended more
than just his batting streak each
sunny summer afternoon that he
collected a base hit. Each day his
streak dominated the idle conversations of Americans, Joltin' Joe also
extended the nation's sense of innocence and trust in the security
offered by the American Dream,
distracting its citizens from the
storm approaching from overseas.
On the other hand, Citizen Kane
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depicted the end of innocence and
the corruption of the American
Dream. A pair of early working
titles originally considered for the
film were American and John Citizen,
U.S.A. Clearly, Welles wanted the
film to be seen as a metaphor for
the dark direction toward which
America was moving.
On that "Day of Infamy" in
December of 1941, Americans were
forced to face the dangerous
elements lurking beyond their
borders and an age of innocence
came to a close. In the decades
ahead the distance from that innocent era grew larger, replaced by a
time filled with terrible experiences:
the atomic bomb, the McCarthy
years, the violent civil rights struggle, the assassinations of the sixties,
the Vietnam War, Watergate, the
drug epidemic, AIDS, materialism,
corrupt evangelists, insider trading
on Wall Street, the savings and loans
scandal, etc. Today, Joe DiMaggio
stands almost as a solitary symbol of
the American Dream in the manner
it existed just before everything
began to unravel. At the age of 76,
DiMaggio's confident, self-assured
dignity appears at old-timer games
like a beacon shining brightly
amidst turbulent waters.
In
contrast, Charles Foster Kane foreshadowed the many public figures,
politicians and personalities, who
would be undone by their corruption of the American Dream in the
latter half of the twentieth century,
and Orson Welles became one of
the first victims of the new age.
In a scene from Citizen Kane, a
magnificently evocative moment
occurs when Kane's assistant,
Bernstein, played by Everett Sloane,
recalls: "One day, back in 1896, I was

crossing over to Jersey, and as we
pulled out, there was another ferry
pulling in, and on it was a girl waiting to get off. A white dress she had
on. She was carrying a white parasol. I only saw her for one second.
She didn't see me at all, but I'll bet
a month hasn't gone by since, that I
haven't thought of that girl."
Metaphorically, the girl in the white
dress, like Joe DiMaggio, might
represent an unattainable innocence remembered regularly only in
daydreams, an emblem of the
simpler, romantic past, the lost
paradise which can never be recaptured.
Today, a half century later, as
the country finds itself at war again,
one hopes that the symmetry,
symmetry suggested by the nation's
unified response to the war, will
signal a conclusion to an era of
torment and turmoil. Perhaps it
may be only wishful thinking, an
attempt to regain the lost paradise,
but one can hope that as the earlier
war initiated an era which in its
darkest moments during the sixties
and seventies eventually tore the
nation apart to a degree only
surpassed by the Civil War era, this
war will begin to move the nation in
a different direction. As community
members pull closer to one another,
as larger congregations pray together with a greater voice, as flags and
ribbons symbolize a sense of solidarity among the citizenry, it would be
pleasant to think this unity might
continue into a new age-a period
in which, once again, characters like
Charles Foster Kane are the exception and role models like Joe
DiMaggio are the rule.
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Trutz Rendtorff. Ethics. Vol. I. Basic
Elements and Methodology in an Ethic.al
Theology. Fortress Press, 1986. 193
pages. $19.95. Vol. II. Applications of
an Ethical Theology. Fortress Press,
1989. 223 pages. $24.95.
What Trutz Rendtorff has
achieved in these two short volumes
can be measured by the fact that
they originally appeared in an eighteen volume series designed to
introduce aspiring pastors and
teachers of religion to the study of
theology. That they are now offered
to the general English speaking
audience testifies that the author
has written not merely a textbook,
but a work which sets out to recast
the image of the theological study of
ethics. The original purpose of
these volumes, however, should forewarn the prospective reader against
selecting them for an evening of
leisurely reading.
Rendtorff marks his break with
a traditional way of doing theological ethics by subtitling both volumes
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as a work in "ethical theology."
Ethics is not to be derived from dogmatics or incorporated into a
systematic theology, but can stand by
itself as a way of doing theology.
Rendtorffs thesis is that ethics itself
is an intensified form of theology
because vital ethical questions compel us to confront the question of
the basis and goal of human life
most directly. Ethics itself requires
theology, and thus ethics and theology
can be employed as synonymous
terms as far as their subject matter is
concerned. The American reader
will r e cognize how closely Rendtorffs approach resembles that of
James Gustafson in his two volume
work on theocentric ethics. In the
preface to the American edition,
Rendtorff notes that his work and
that of Gustafson were originally
published at almost the same time.
Whereas Gustafson's work was "a
Reformed theology, of sorts," Rendtorff characterizes his as "a
Lutheran theology, of sorts."
As might be anticipated, doing
ethical theology requires an engagement with the human sciences .
Rendtorff's continuing dialogue
with these sources draws him
beyond German scholarship into a
continuing interchange with American, British and Scandinavian
authors. The academic grapevine
attributes to Rendtorff the comment
that no German student should be
allowed to complete graduate studies in theological ethics without
spending at least one year studying
in the United States. Unfortunately
the copiously cited references for
engaging in this dialogue are almost
exclusively in German.
Rendtorff acknowledges that
doing ethical theology in contemporary western society can begin

neither by an analysis of the life
world or by directly addressing contemporary moral issues. The
primary moral question is no longer
how the individual relates to the
world in which we live, for the very
foundations of that world have
become the overriding issue. In politics, discussing issues moves quickly
to considering the very relevance of
politics itself. Ecological decisions
lead directly to probing the question
of the relationship of human beings
to nature. And the same holds true
with questions about human sexuality and marriage. The first task of
ethics is the formation of an ethical
consciousness capable of coping
with moral questions.
In his brief consideration of
ethics in the New Testament, Rendtorff concludes
that early
Christianity placed the entire conduct of life under a comprehensive,
unified principle, that of Christian
freedom. This included the fundamental insight that the indicative is
the basis and presupposition of
imperatives as well as coming to fulfillment through the imperative.
Rendtorff interprets freedom in its
essence as protection from immediacy, from being delivered up
defenseless to the world of activities
and affairs. Ethics endeavors to create an ethos which can give a
practical and relevant shape to the
indicative of freedom in face of the
pressure of obligations in situations
which require immediate action.
Ethics can claim relevance and practicality only by providing the ability
to move beyond the alternatives
which ossifY debates under the pressures of immediate circumstances.
Ethics must take a stand, but it must
do this in such a way that genuinely
ethical questions remain possible
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and meaningful.
In executing his ethical theology, Rendtorff first analyzes the three
basic elements of the ethical reality
of life. His schema closely resembles
the dialectical relation between the
individual and culture formulated
by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann: A person is born into a
culture, the person internalizes that
culture, and the person contributes
to the renewal and reform of that
culture. The three elements, which
provide the framework for the
whole of Rendtorff's work, are the
givenness of life, the giving of life,
and reflection on life. The givenness
of life comprehends both the fact
that life is a gift and that it is a specific life which can be lived only by
the person to whom it is given,
which provides the context for discussing the freedom of the Christian
person. The giving of life implies
that doing good is essentially a matter of being useful to others which
illuminates how love provides the
gestalt for freedom. And the very
fullness of life, which provides more
possibilities than can be realized
and extends beyond the life of the
individual, leads to reflection on
life.
Rendtorff provides no rationale for his selection of the three
basic elements. Presumably he
assumes that the reader will be convinced of their fundamental and
comprehensive character as they are
elaborated in the text. The theologically alert reader might discern
trinitarian overtones in the selection. If this is the case, it would not
conflict with Rendtorffs basic intention. For the doctrine of the Trinity
is not a dogmatic construct derived
by systematically relating biblical
texts, but the result of an intense
effort to understand how the confession of Jesus as Lord informs living
in a historical and material world.
Next, Rendtorff takes up the
question of ethical methodology,
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which he focuses on the simple
question, "What should we do?"
Instead of treating the question of
how to make moral decisions, Rendtorff elaborates the method by
which we come to consciousness of
our place in reality and our active
participation in it. This means first
coming to terms with what has been
given to us, which is the literal
meaning of tradition. The giveness
of life defines duties or obligations,
and the methodology plots the
movement from dependence to
freedom and from a recognition of
the givenness of life to an affirmation of reality. Second, the giving of
life requires clarifYing what it means
to assume responsibility for one's
own life. The responsible life
depends upon nurturing the personal virtues which embody the
moral principles learned through
decision-making. In this context,
Rendtorff offers a threefold answer
to the question of the specifically
Christian features of the ethical life.
It is a historically distinct way of life
derived from a specific historical
starting point. It is a life of radical
freedom based on an intensive
closeness in relation to God made
possible through Jesus Christ rather
than living in terms of a defined
moral code. And it is universal in
the sense that a Christian life is possible everywhere and at every time.
In part three of the methodology, Rendtorff argues that reflection
on life undertakes the justification
for ethics, which requires defining
the highest good. On the way to formulating his answer, he engages in
an interchange with the critical theory of Herbert Marcuse, the
Anglo-Saxon tradition of analytical
ethics, the communicative theory of
Juergen Habermas and Karl Otto
Apel, and the functional sociology
of Niklas Luhmann. In a brief treatment which begs for elaboration,
Rendtorff argues that the Christian
theme of the Kingdom of God,

while it cannot take the place of
ethics or be ethics, makes ethics possible and demands that it be
practiced, "by confining it within
the boundaries of an independent
human task and freeing it from the
burden of wanting to be something
other than the study of how human
life should be lived . "
While the theologically uninitiated reader of Rendtorff's first
volume may have the feeling of wading in murky theological waters, the
second volume should prove more
inviting. Here the author provides a
broad treatment of contemporary
moral issues, including topics such
as educational reform, family planning, social welfare, participatory
management, the relations of men
and women, ecology, abortion, the
conflict of the rich and poor
nations, the ethics of pastoral counselling,
liturgical
practices,
economic growth and quality of life,
and care for the aged. In every
instance, the treatment is concise,
deliberate and cogent. The uniqueness, however, lies in Rendtorff's
procedure in treating these topics.
Instead of dealing with questions
topically, he examines them in
terms of his basic threefold schema.
The English sub-title "Applications" may prove misleading. The
term implies that something is
being applied, which commonly
refers to the application of principles to moral topics. This may be
what people expect of ethicists,
whether the topic is medical ethics,
business ethics or family life. But
this is precisely not what Rendtorff
sets out to do. Literally, the German
term translated "applications" would
be rendered "concretizations" or "rendering concrete." The entire volume
embodies the author's conviction
that for ethical theology constructive work takes priority over
criticism, or put simply, "the Yes is
more important than the No." An
ethical theology seeks first to dis-
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cern how moral issues arise out of
different spheres of life, then examines
how
people
assume
responsibility when the moral
dimension is taken seriously, and
finally reflect on points of conflict
which emerge.
Rendtorff proposes to examine
five spheres of life as examples to
illuminate his ethical theology: marriage, politics, economics, culture
and religion. But in accord with his
purpose, instead of examining the
areas serially, he runs them through
his grid. Each sphere of life is analyzed in terms of the three basic
elements of ethical reality, and each
of these in terms of the three
methodological aspects of the ethical question. Hence, the reader
interested in what Rendtorff has to
say on a topic such as marriage or
economics will have to examine the
nine separate sections in which each
is treated. This ethics is clearly not
intended to serve as a reference
book to see what the author has to
say about an issue, but as method by
which to introduce readers to ethical reflection.
That Rendtorff's procedure
proves productive can be illustrated
by a cursory examination of his
treatment of culture. Beginning
with the basic element of the givenness of life leads to the recognition
that in all experience of reality we
encounter the activity of human
consciousness. Individuals adopt a
personal stance in the context of the
cultural definition of life, not out of
some human nature outside and prior to culture. The task of education
is not mere socialization, but
enabling an individual to adopt a
stance. Instead of assuming an individual is autonomous, education
enables a person to become selfdetermining in relation to culture.
In our scientific and technological
culture, the function of ethics is not
to define limits from the outside but
in terms of the concrete responsibility of science and technology
March, 1991

themselves.
When culture is examined in
terms of the basic element of giving
life, it becomes clear that the school
contributes to the formation of culture by enabling the individual not
simply to find herself but to relate
the self to the culture and contribute to its development. A person
serves culture by acquiring the etiquette and manners which enable
people to move freely anywhere, to
respect differences and to relate to
strangers. To maintain the worth
and credibility of tradition depends
upon a continuing critique provided
particularly by the arts, which stimulate critical reflection through the
impact of aesthetic experience when
freed of immediate moral or political intentions.
Finally, the basic element of
reflection serves the affirmation of
life in the midst of conflict. The controversy which has resulted from the
unintended consequences of technology requires acting in such a way
that we can correct ourselves by consequences of our action. In the
discussion of health care, it needs to
be remembered that health is the
strength to live with disorders, not
the absence of disorders. Otherwise
we would always have a reason for
feeling sick, because sickness is a situation where help is needed.
Patients surrender their independence in consulting a physician and
the limit and extent of the physician's involvement should be
defined by the independence which
the patient seeks to regain. With
respect to the elderly, the task is to
find the ways to support their independence and dignity. This requires
overcoming the one-sided view that
strength is indispensable to human
dignity. And a crucial test of a culture will be its ability to care for the
dying.
Because he is true to the
method he espouses, Rendtorff has
formulated his ethical theology
apropros contemporary German

culture. Because of the substantive
similarities between German culture
and American culture, however, the
American reader will discover this
work consistently pertinent and illuminating. Rendtorff's ability to
make clear that when theology is
taken seriously it must be what has
become known as "public theology"
is of singular significance. And this
task begins by trying to discern the
moral dimension in life rather than
endeavoring to impose so-called
Christian principles and rules on
society. And Lutheran readers will
profit from pondering how Rendtorff unpacks
the
ethical
significance of the doctrine of justification and finds a way through the
impasse of debates on law and
gospel and the doctrine of the two
kingdoms.
On the whole, the translator
has done a creditable job of rendering Rendtorff's German into
readable English. There are
instances, too frequent to enumerate, however, where the translation
is not only infelicitious but mistaken. This is particularly troublesome
in a work so condensed and succinct
that each sentence bears great
freight. Fortunately, in most cases
the context will carry the reader
through. But when puzzled, the
English reader will have to give
Rendtorff the benefit of the doubt
until he can consult the original
text.
Dale Lasky

Martin Luther King, Jr. The Trumpet
of Conscience. With forward by Coretta Scott King, Harper & Row, 1968,
1987.

It is fitting that these collected
final statements of Dr. King should
be juxtaposed in revival with Dr.
James Cone's 20th Anniversary edition of Black Theology and Black
Power. It is also fitting to publish this
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book at a time when the media carries stories of the plagiarism
revelations surrounding Dr. King's
doctoral dissertation at Boston University. As a King admirer, my
admiration was not based on his
scholarship but on his courage of
leadership that moved America to
re-think its racial attitudes, change
its laws and refocus its fundamental
dream. This little book of 78 pages
contains the Massey Lectures deliveredover the Canadian Broadcasting
Corporation in 1967. It deepens my
admiration.
In beautiful style Dr. King takes
the opportunity to stir the conscience of his listeners on the
subjects uppermost on his mind,
namely, nonviolent protest and civil
disobedience, resistance to the Vietnam war, the role of youth, black
and white, in shaping a new world,
urban decay and unemployment,
and finally, his Christmas Eve sermon at the Ebenezer Baptist Church
in Atlanta.
Always the advocate of non-violent resistance to oppression (in this
he contrasts with James Cone's justification of violence), Dr. King places
the blame on the "cause of darkness" that brought on the riots in
the cities. The cause lies on the
doorstep of white society. His alternative to civil riots is mass civil
disobedience. As expected, King
gives us the larger picture "The
Negro (interesting he does not use
the term "black" as Dr. Cone does)
revolt calls into challenge the system
that has created the miracles of production and technology." And "the
American Negro is in the vanguard
in a prolonged struggle that may
change the shape of the world."
King judges the Vietnam war as
"being on the wrong side of a world
revolution" which we helped begin
with our own revolution. Our "arrogance" prevents us from seeing that
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we have become the "arch-antirevolutionaries." In this reviewer's
mind, Dr. King would have been
one of the first to oppose American
lives being sacrificed in the Persian
Gulf conflict. He believed non-violence was not only right but
practical. Like Jesus and Ghandi
before him, he was willing to lay
down his own life for the cause of
justice and truth.
Understandably, his Christmas
sermon turns to the subject of
peace. He affirms that war has
become obsolete in a nuclear age
and the necessity of interrelatedness
and dignity of human life. What do
we believe when our dreams turn
into nightmares?- obvious to persons of faith-Keep the Dream.
John D. Wolf

James H. Cone. Blaclc Theology and
Blaclt Power. New York, Harper &
Row, 1989 (20th Anniversary Edition).
It has been twenty years since
James Cone sounded the clarion
attack upon white racism, white theology, and white churches with the
words, "The Black Revolution is the
work of Christ" The analysis of how
we got to where we are is devastating
to the prevailing mentality tired of
hearing words like "freedom" and
"equality" after the civil rights movement. The fact is, Dr. Cone will not
let us "be at ease in Zion." He predicts doom upon the white church
and forecasts the rise of Black Power
as the salvation of Christianity. "The
message of Black Power is the message of Christ" (37) "Christianity is
not alien to Black Power; it is Black
Power." (38) "Christ is black, baby."
(68) To say Dr. Cone's view is "hardhitting theology" is to put the case
mildly. He makes no apologies as he

kicks theology off its academic
pedestal and abstract rhetoric as he
directs our attention to the continuing goal of black liberation. He
diagnoses the "sickness of the American Church" as intimately involved
with the bankruptcy of American
theology.
Dr. Cone believes "whites are
enslaved by their own racism." Just
as God made the Hebrew people
His special people while they suffered under oppression, chose His
own Son to suffer under the oppression of the religious establishment,
so today's Black Church is the
instrument of God's salvation. Born
in slavery, the Black Church became
the platform for announcing freedom and equality. Tracing its history
before and after the Civil War, he
paints to the Richard Allen break
that formed the separate African
Methodist Episcopal Church in 1787
as the new beginning of purification
against the "evils of white power."
Ironically the black man saw the
white master's religion as the best
way to freedom. That insight
required separate churches and a
Black Theology.
Dr. Cone answers the stereotype that black theology was
required to emphasize an eschatology that was other-worldly. Just as the
Christian faith is anchored in history, so black theology is "earthly,"
meaning, it brought confrontation
with the system that would deny
human dignity and freedom. Just as
white society wants to assume that
everything is basically all right, the
black power emphasis will not allow
its revolution to be lost. Dr. Cone
pays special tribute to Martin Luther
King, Jr. as a 20th century return to
the pre-Civil War preachers who set
"black people's hearts on fire with
the gospel of freedom in Christ"

John D. Wolf
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